

UNIVERSITY OF BOTSWANA

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE STUDIES(PAS)

**MASTER OF ARTS IN POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS(MAPIR)**



POL 718: RESEARCH ESSAY

Sino- Botswana relations: Drivers. Status. Determinants

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A research essay submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree of Master in Arts in Politics and International relations (MAPIR)

September 2019

DEDICATIONS

This research is dedicated to the memory of my late grandmother, Mrs Marea Ofithile (1910-2005).

STATEMENT OF REQUIREMENTS

This research is being submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Masters in Arts in Politics and International Relations (MAPIR).

DECLARATION

This research is the result of my own independent work/ investigation, except where otherwise stated. Other sources are acknowledged and a bibliography is affixed. I have not previously, in its entirety or in part, submitted it at any university for a degree.

Signed

(Galaletsang Dintsi)

Date

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to first acknowledge the contribution of my mother, Ms Maitshwarelo Ofithile. She is the one that pushed me to read for my second degree. She will, as years passed ask when I intend to go back to school. I heeded her advice and I have her to thank for this great milestone in my academic life.

I have also been lucky to have the support of my family; my husband; Samuel Dintsi and my daughters; Leno, Mmasechaba and Lerato who endured all kinds of complaints and self-doubting rants when the research process seemed long, arduous and unending. Most importantly I would like to thank them for their love for it was enough to motivate me to do better. I hope the commitment that I displayed in working on this research will teach my daughters valuable lessons on; commitment, work ethic and resilience.

I would also like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Gladys Mokhawa for her patience and the immense work that she had to do to ensure that this is a research I will be proud of. Any research student will attest the importance of a good supervisor, I was lucky.

I would also like to thank my friends and the rest of my extended family for always believing in me. I am aware of how proud they are of me.

ABSTRACT

The paper seeks to find out what drives the Botswana-China relations. In addition, it also explains the current status of relations between the two. To achieve these objectives a qualitative desktop research was carried out; data from both governments as well as other secondary sources (journals, textbooks, newspaper articles) were used. The findings demonstrated that the individual decision maker operating in a changed domestic and international environment has reoriented some aspects of Botswana's foreign policy towards China. This is because as proven, decision makers do not exist in a vacuum and hence factors in their environment will play a part in their decision-making process.

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CHAPTER 1

1.0 INTRODUCTION

Botswana and China have been diplomatic partners since 1975. These relations were formed during the Cold War when ideology, was a key determining factor of relations. Despite different ideological orientations, the two found themselves pulled together by, “an akin detest to superpower machinations and the then southern African politics” (Taylor,1998:82). They both shared an independent Foreign policy and chose not to be involved in the current politics of that time.

It has however been noticeable that Botswana-China relations are not as they used to be. There is an apparent shift in Botswana’s Foreign policy towards China. The relations have been described as complex and problematic by Moahi (2015:2) and Youngman (2017:16) concludes that, “overall, the literature shows a deterioration in bilateral relations in recent years”. This has been evidenced by Botswana speaking against China regarding; the South China Sea territorial claims, shoddy works performed by some Chinese companies, low quality goods and as recently as 2017, the country even went further to issue Visa to The Dalai lama , who China regards, “as an anti-China separatist” (Chinese Embassy ,2017).

The aim of the paper was to find out what drives the Botswana-China relations as well as to explain the current status and the determinants of the state of relations. The findings are that; the individual decision maker (Khama and his Foreign policy team) operating in a changed domestic and

international environment re-oriented Botswana's foreign policy behaviour and direction towards China.

1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY

1.1.2 HISTORICAL: CHINA - AFRICA RELATIONS

Although at present there is an upsurge of excitement about the advent of China in Africa, China is not entirely a new entrant in Africa. Scholars have through various works traced contact between China and Africa to several centuries ago (Shinn et al, 2012:17). The presence of Chinese goods on African soil can be traced to as early as the Han dynasty (206 BCE-220 CE) whilst other researchers believe trade with Africa started at a later period of the Tang Dynasty (618-907), (Ibid). It is also reported that between 1405 and 1533, Zheng launched eight great expeditions and made calls to what is now called, Tanzania, Somalia, Kenya, and Madagascar (Pere, 2008:21). There are of course disputed claims of the first contact, but it is apparent that Chinese engagement in Africa is not entirely new.

However, consensus amongst several writers is that, it is the Bandung conference of 1955 that is pivotal in the establishment of Sino-African relations. It is during the conference that the then Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai had separate talks with Egyptian Premier Nasser that resulted with Egypt being the first African country in 1956 to establish diplomatic relations with China (Hongwu, 2009:26). The conference provided Premier Zhou Enlai opportunity to express their support for independence movements in Africa and condemn colonialism and imperialism (Shinn &

Eisenman, 2012:33). Diplomatic relations with other countries soon followed. The relations between China and Africa have gone through different epochs. Anshan, (2007:74) explains that, “from the birth of PRC to 1978, China’s policy was influenced by ideology, later on by political pragmatism and the current relationship is based on economic pragmatism”. The turning point in China’s foreign policy is believed to have emanated from the Deng era. “From the beginning of reform and opening up in 1979 to the mid-1990s, the focus of China’s foreign policy shifted to supporting domestic economic development” (Sun,2014:6). In concurrence to Sun (2014), Taylor (2006:443), states that, “after 1978, China’s Foreign Policy was largely dedicated to fostering the economic modernisation programme begun under the auspices of Deng, and though remaining friendly to Africa, China was preoccupied with economic matters”. In their quest for economic modernisation, China’s interest in Africa waned. The loss of interest was evident in the amount of trade between China and Africa as well as the amount of aid it gave in comparison to during both the Cold War and Cultural revolution (ibid).

It was the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square event that brought back China to Africa. While the West condemned China for human rights violations, it was Africa that offered solidarity. According to, Sun (2014:5) “it was Botswana, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Angola, Zambia and Mozambique that saved China by inviting Chinese Foreign Minister for official visits in August 1989”. At present China has diplomatic relations with 51 African countries and Botswana is amongst them.

1.13 BOTSWANA- CHINA RELATIONS

The start of the political connection between China and Africa is believed to be the Bandung conference, a relationship with Botswana was only forged in the 1970's. Several academics have written to an extent about Botswana-China relations. Taylor (1996,1998,2006) and Bolaane (2007) trace historical factors that led to diplomatic relations between the two. At independence, Botswana had initially befriended Taiwan. According to Taylor, to lessen its dependence on its minority ruled neighbour states, Botswana developed close relations with Zambia, it is that relationship that made Botswana amenable to links with non-capitalist states such as Yugoslavia and China (Taylor,2006:182).

This is buttressed by a now declassified cabinet memorandum presented by Minister Kgari, the then Minister of State, titled, *Position paper on Botswana's relations with the People's Republic of China and Taiwan*, which states that, "the Chinese have behaved perfectly in both Tanzania and Zambia; and this view has been supported by both Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda who have at different times informed the President of how well-behaved and helpful the Chinese have been in their respective countries"(Botswana National Archives and Records; CAB.MEM/ 317, 1974 annex a: 2). This is a clear validation that in considering a diplomatic partnership Botswana relied on some of her friends in the region to decide.

In a surprise twist, Botswana voted for the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1971 to assume the UN Security Council permanent seat instead of her

friend Taiwan (Bolaane,2007:146). In 1975, Botswana eventually formed diplomatic relationship with mainland China. According to Taylor, “China thus was a useful ally by which Botswana could strive for an assertion of its own international identity and conversely, Botswana was a state at the centre of the southern African maelstrom through which Beijing could protect its policies and agenda vis-à-vis southern Africa and superpower expansionism” (Taylor, 1998: 82).

It is not only China that found the relations to be useful their Botswana counterparts were also full of praises. During a state banquet held in his honour during a state visit to China, the then President Masire asserted that, “Botswana, like the Republic of China pursues the policy of equality and peaceful co-existence in international relations” (Botswana National Archives and Records, 1983, 10/3: pg. 6). Clearly the relations were centred on mutual respect particularly because of a shared independent foreign policy. Both Countries preferred not to take sides during the Cold War and generally avoided to be dragged in the superpower rivalries that was the order of the day.

The two countries have supported each other in different ways during their relationship. As already alluded to, Botswana voted for PRC to assume the Security Council seat at the very start of their relations. In 1977, China returned the favour by supporting two motions in favour of Botswana in the Security Council (Taylor,1998:82). The two resolutions 403, and 406 expressed support to Botswana against acts of harassment from Southern Rhodesia (white-minority ruled Rhodesia) and appealed on behalf of

Botswana for member states and organizations to assist Botswana in anyway

(http://www.un.org/eng/ga.search/vie_doc.asp?symbol=s/RES/403 (1977)).

At the time, Chinese support was crucial as Botswana, a majority black ruled republic was surrounded by unfriendly minority white ruled states.

Botswana has also enjoyed the perks of friendship with China by being one of the recipients of its aid. Chinese aid can be said to have started in 1976 when Gaborone and Beijing signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement. Gaborone later received, an amount of US\$16.6 million interest free loan to be used for development projects (Taylor, 1998:84). However, it is in the 1980's that China's presence became more noticeable. In 1981 the first medical team arrived in Botswana. According to the Chinese embassy, "Since 1981, China has sent 373 medical experts to Botswana and treated more than 2 million Botswana patients" (http://bw.China_embassy.org/engsbgx/t40499.htm).

The protocol on the renewal and development of the Botswana's railway line was signed in 1982 (Taylor, 1998:85). However, work started in earnest in 1985. The education sector has previously and continues to benefit from Chinese aid in a big way. The Botswana Daily News (2013) reported that Honourable Skelemani, former Foreign Affairs Minister had expressed his gratitude toward China for assisting in the education of Batswana. The former Minister had commended that the Chinese had started with awarding 5 scholarships and have now increased to 17 scholarships

annually. Still in education, primary schools have been built with the assistance of China (Ibid).

On the economic front, China –Botswana relations look good. According to Sekakela (2016:6), “China is now Botswana’s fastest growing trading partner. Today China is Botswana’s 12th largest export market and 3rd most important source of imports.” This is astronomical when compared to the year 2000 when China ranked 50th as Botswana’s export market and 12th as Botswana’s source of imports (Ibid).

Botswana-China relations have been cordial. In recent years there have been however disagreements regarding construction projects, the quality of Chinese goods and Foreign policy issues. “There is no evidence in the literature that in the period prior to 2000 there were any problems within the relationship” (Youngman,2017:13). It is against this background that the research seeks to find out what drives the current Botswana-China relations.

1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT

Botswana -China relations are not new and have withstood cold war and ideology politics as well southern African minority ruled states maelstrom. Contemporary China -Africa relations are said to be centred around resources as China’s quest for energy resources; oil and coal is well documented. This research seeks to find out what kind of relationship Botswana has with China. How can we explain the Botswana-China relationship? It is in that context that this research seeks to find out what

drives the relations between the two countries. Most importantly what are the determinants of the current state of relations?

1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The paper seeks to answer the below questions;

- What are the main drivers of the Botswana-China relations?
- How are the current Botswana-China relations?
- What are the main determinants contributing to the shift in Foreign policy of Botswana towards China?
- What lessons can be derived from the Botswana-China relations?

1.4 JUSTIFICATION/SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY

Ian Taylor has written to an extent on the independent Foreign policy of Botswana during the Cold War as well as during the time when her neighbours were minority ruled states. Two of his works stand out; Taylor (1998) and Taylor (2006). Another piece of work is by Bolaane (2007) which offers a historical perspective of China-Botswana relations. The paper assesses the relations of Botswana and China from 1975 up to the thirtieth anniversary.

Chen (2009) concentrated on China's contribution to Botswana's infrastructure and argued that China has played a central role in the development of Botswana's infrastructure. Most recently in 2016, Sekakela (2016) wrote about the impact of trading with China on Botswana's economy

and concluded that the main driver of the partnership between the two countries has been the trade channel.

Therefore, this research intends to contribute to the existing literature on China-Africa relations. Most importantly the two countries celebrated 40 years of diplomatic relations in 2015. The research is timely and important for the leadership of both countries to have an impartial assessment of the current state of their diplomatic partnership.

This research intends to contribute to policy and this will help the two countries to better understand each other which will improve their future working relationship in other areas.

1.5 SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS

In chapter 1 an introduction, background of the study was given. Most importantly the problem was contextualised. The research questions as well as the justification of study were given. Chapter 2 provides the review of literature on Foreign Policy. Chapter 3 is the design and methodology chapter. It will explain how the research was designed as well as the methodology and methods chosen. Ethical considerations as well as limitations of the study will be provided. In Chapter 4 data will be presented and most importantly findings of the research questions from the data collected. Analysis of data presented will be offered in this chapter. In chapter 5, conclusions will be made based on the data presented and discussions. Most importantly recommendations will also be offered.

1.6 CHAPTER SUMMARY

An introduction to the research was given and most importantly a background of the study was laid out. This was done to give context and to situate the research. The problem was defined followed by the research questions that will help the research to arrive at illuminating findings and conclusions. A justification of the study was offered. Lastly a summary of chapters was given. Next follows the Literature review chapter.

CHAPTER 2

2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 OVERVIEW

In the literature review chapter, the intention is to first conceptualise what Foreign policy is and most importantly use mainstream theories (Realism, Liberalism and constructivism) as a theoretical lens. The research will also discuss the advent of Foreign Policy analysis (FPA) as a response to the failures of mainstream theories to explain foreign policy. Literature on the foreign policy of both China and Botswana is going to be scrutinised. For better analysis, literature surrounding the drivers of foreign policy and most importantly what will cause redirection of foreign policy will also be looked into.

2.1.1 CONCEPTUALISATION

A definition of the concept foreign policy is of paramount importance. Different scholars have defined what Foreign policy is, Hudson, (2012:14) defines Foreign policy as, “the strategy or approach chosen by the national government to achieve its goals in its relations with external entities. This includes decisions to do nothing.” Breuning (2007:5) defines Foreign policy as, “the totality of a country’s policies toward and interactions with the environment beyond its borders.”

Beach (2012:3) defines Foreign Policy as; “both the broad trends of behaviour and the particular actions taken by a state or other collective

actor as directed toward other collective actors within the international system.” It is Beach’s definition that is preferred as it clearly shows that there is a multiplicity of actors involved in Foreign policy. The definition also explains that Foreign policy is both the behaviour and actions towards other actors. Definitions alone will not be useful, to better understand the concept of Foreign policy, it will be useful to use mainstream International relations theories as foundations of conceptualisation.

2.2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

2.2.1 REALISM

Realism as a dominant theory in International relations (IR) and Foreign policy will be used for analysis. The same shall be done for Liberalism as well as Constructivism. According to Wohlforth, (2012:35) the central tenets of realism are;

- Groupism -that humans face each other as groups and the most common group being nation states.
- Egoism is rooted in human nature
- Power centrism is regarded as the fundamental feature of politics

Realists believe that because of the egoistic nature of humans who are concerned with power, and the fact that there is no overarching power over states, the international system is anarchic and it is therefore ‘survival of the fittest’ as states fend for themselves (Beach,2012:35). In addition, because of this anarchic environment no state trusts the other and hence concerns about relative gains dominate. (Ibid) Simply put states will not

enter in relations if they do not stand to benefit more. In a nutshell, Realism places system level factors as more prominent in the determination of foreign policy goals. The realists do not look within the state but conclude that policy can only be affected externally. To realists, internal components of the state; politicians, the public, media, bureaucracy, civil society, ideas will not influence policy but rather material or physical aspects of the state will determine policy. Hill, (2003:6) too asserts that realism does not probe into decision making or other domestic sources of international behaviour. Kegley & Wittkopf (1993:45) buttresses Hill's point by stating that for realists, "...the leaders who make foreign policy, the types of governments they lead, the characteristics of their societies, and the internal economic and political conditions of the states they lead are unimportant."

According to realists then, the state foreign policy goals is determined by external factors for example; where it is placed in the international system; is it a great power? Is it a small power that will need to align with great powers? Alden & Aran (2017:20) postulates it better, "realists believe that all states' foreign policies conform to basic parameters set by the anarchic international system. Above all, realists stress, scholars need to investigate the influences of the structure of the international system and the relative power of states in order to understand the outcomes of foreign policy decisions". There are different strands of realism but what they agree on is that states are under anarchy, and the main actor is the unitary state in politics.

2.2.2 LIBERALISM

Liberalism another mainstream theory is less pessimistic in that though it also emphasises the presence of anarchy, to liberals, anarchy does not equal total warfare. According to Doyle (2012:54), Liberalism's contribution to the understanding of foreign policy has been in highlighting how individuals and the ideas and ideals they espouse (human rights, liberty and democracy), social forces (capitalism, markets), and political institutions (democracy, representation) can have direct effects on foreign relations. This basically means in choosing a foreign policy behaviour/action a state will look within its domestic constituents and satisfy itself first if the policy to be taken is consistent with what the individuals espouse for.

Liberalism constitutes an 'inside-out' approach to IR, where the behaviour of states can be explained by their endogenous arrangements (Burchill, 2009:58). There are different strands of Liberalism. Another strand of liberalism; Liberal Institutionalists, also emphasised that institutions, regional organisations and international organisations like UN, will provide states with an overarching power to mediate over conflict. That is institutions have the power to mitigate the effects of anarchy. Burchill (2009:67) posits that, "Liberal Institutionalists believe international relations need not be a zero-sum game, as many states feel secure enough to maximise their own gains regardless of what accrues to others."

Another strand, Democratic peace theory, propagates that liberals will not fight other liberals and will only fight non-liberals in defence (Burchill,

2009:62). For them the spread of Liberalism will eventually bring peace. Therefore, when it comes to foreign policy behaviour states will choose actions and behaviour that will seek to protect its citizens, guarantee their civil liberties and most importantly will not fight other liberals. As already stated, Liberals do agree with the realists that states do exist in anarchy. They differ however, in that unlike realists who see a perpetual state of war, Liberals differ with realists as they believe that liberals do share a separate zone of peace with other liberals (Doyle, 2012:66).

2.2.3 CONSTRUCTIVISM

In stark contrast to the two theories is constructivism. This theory's genesis is said to be a result of the failure of mainstream theories to predict or explain the end of the Cold War (Flockhart, 2012:79). The two already discussed are system level theories in that they both take the state as the main actor in international politics. For constructivists, state is a creation like any other social construct. This is a domestic theory in that it looks within the state to the actors who conduct policy.

According to Reus-Smit (2009:212), Constructivism is premised on three ontological propositions about social life; the importance of normative as well as material structures, role of identity in shaping political action and mutually constitutive relationship between agents and structures. On the first point the emphasis is that as much as material/physical structures are important and can shape foreign policy, ideational or normative structures (shared beliefs, and values) do have a bearing on social and political action

as well(ibid). Unlike the realists, constructivists posit that “structure cannot be understood through reference only to material forces such as natural resources and military power but that it consists of both material and ideational factors” (Flockhart, 2012:83). To constructivists, understanding a foreign policy behaviour of a state, is a task that starts with having an understanding of the actors, physical as well as ideational structures as the state is not an uninterested, unfeeling, unitary actor.

To buttress the point Flockhart (2012:83) gives an example of foreign policy behaviour of the United States towards France and North Korea on the other hand. Both have nuclear programmes. The argument is that though both nuclear programmes can have devastating consequences but because we attach different meanings, foreign policies of the US toward these two have been different. This is because France is considered a friend and North Korea an enemy. Therefore, the fact that the US has different relations with the two is because the US has attached different meanings to the two. France is a friend and hence is not regarded as a threat, North Korea is an enemy and hence its nuclear programme is regarded as a threat. This is why US governments, one after the other have concentrated efforts in trying to get North Korea to abandon its nuclear programme (ibid).

It is against the backdrop of the failures of the IR theories to explain Foreign policy that Foreign policy analysis emerged as a separate entity seeking to explain Foreign policy.

2.2.4 FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS (FPA)

The study of foreign policy-foreign policy analysis (FPA)- as a subfield in international relations dates back to the late 1950's and early 1960's (Hudson,2012:13). In comparison to IR, FPA focuses on the foreign policy process, as opposed to foreign policy outcomes, it is predicated on the belief that closer scrutiny of the actors, their motivations, the structures of decision making and the broader context within which foreign policy choices are formulated would provide greater analytical purchase than could be found in utilising an IR approach (Alden& Aran, 2017:4).

Central to the study of FPA is the need to 'unblack box' international politics and look within the state. The main point of departure between IR theory and Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) is IR theory's ground as a unitary and unfeeling state. It gives an impression that whatever decision-making unit is involved; state, individual, a group, this unit can be approximated to a unitary rational actor and be equivalent to the state (Hudson,2005:2). This is referred to as black boxing the state or the "billiard model of state interaction" (Ibid).

FPA, on the other hand, assumes that human decision makers acting singly or in groups are the ground of all that happens in international relations and that such decision makers are not best approximated as unitary rational actors equivalent to the state. This is referred to as an actor-specific theory whilst a theory that sees the state as its ground is referred to as actor-general theory. Beach, (2012:4) differentiates between International relations and FPA and argues that though IR encompasses Foreign policy

actions of individual states but it also looks at the workings of the international system itself, including questions such as why the international institutions are created and what impact they have upon world politics and why global problems such as climate change are so difficult to handle.

Beach further explained that the sub discipline of FPA is however narrower in focus and it concerns itself with “explaining the determinants of the foreign policies of a single state (or other collective actor) viewed either as general trends (e.g. US foreign policy towards Latin America) or specific actions (e.g. the US decision to go to war against Iraq in 2003 (Beach, 2012:4-5). Alden & Aran (2017:3) also differentiates between the two by stating that, “While IR scholars understood their role as being to interpret the broad features of the international system, FPA specialists saw their mandate as being a concentration on actual state conduct and the sources of decisions. Diplomacy, intelligence, trade negotiations and cultural exchanges all form part of the substance of foreign policy between international actors.”

The study of FPA is premised around three paradigmatic works;

- Decision making as an Approach to the study of International Politics by Richard T. Snyder, Bruck, and Burton Sapin (1954)
It was the work of Richard Snyder and colleagues that broke ground by challenging the then conclusion that the level of analysis in international relations is the unitary state, and

implored researchers to look below the nation state level of analysis to the players involved (Hudson, 2012:14).

- Pre-theories and Theories of Foreign Policy by James N. Rosenau (1964)
- Man-Milieu Relationship Hypothesis in the Context of International Politics by Harold and Margaret Sprout (1956). The emphasis on individual decision makers in FPA led scholars to focus on psychological and cognitive factors as explanatory sources of foreign policy choice (Hudson, 2005:7).

Hudson, (2005:11) surmises that the message of these three paradigmatic works persuaded some scholars that understanding particularities of human beings involved in the foreign policy making was important to understand foreign policy choice. Now that the evolution of Foreign policy has been discussed the paper seeks to focus on the actual foreign policy process. How are decisions made and who makes them?

2.3 FOREIGN POLICY PROCESS

Breuning (2007:11) postulates that there are three level of analysis, “the individual, the state and the international system. These three levels of analysis correspond to the different foci of foreign policy analysis: individuals ponder options and make decisions, states engage in foreign policy behaviours, and the interaction between states in the international system yields outcomes.” It is this statement that best describes the Foreign policy making process. In a nutshell Foreign policy decision making involves

different multiple actors who act within both the domestic and international environment.

Hudson (2005:3) reminds us that Foreign policy analysis theory is actor-specific, that is unlike theory on international relations, it does not black box human decision makers. Hermann & Hermann (1989:362), find that, “actors in Foreign policy are a set of authorities who have the power to commit resources of the society and most importantly the authority to make irreversible decisions”. Carlsnaes (2012) and Breuning (2007) though in agreement with Hermann & Hermann (1989) do show that these leaders/authorities decision making process is permeated by a whole of other factors and actors. Carlsnaes (2012:14) posits that, “in the real world we find many actors, both domestic and international, who are closely involved in foreign policy decision making in one manner or another; and equally there are a number of structures on both sides of the domestic-international divide which decisively affect these actors in many ways.”

This is echoed by Breuning (2007:6) who also does recognise the role of leaders in foreign policy making but interestingly adds that, “leaders do not exist in a vacuum; they are surrounded by advisors and a bureaucracy, influenced by domestic constituencies, and dependent on the power their state can project in the international arena. The best explanations of the foreign policy choices of countries are frequently found in the complex interplay of multiple factors.” Alden (2017:1), finds that a, “dizzying array of characters – leaders, bureaucracies, militaries, lobbyists, think tanks, United Nations (UN) agencies, non-governmental organizations (NGOs),

terrorist and criminal organizations, as well as ordinary citizens – operate within this complex environment, exercising influences over foreign policy that results in vital decisions on war, peace and prosperity”.

In a nutshell, the foreign policy making process is not simplistic, a multiple of actors are involved and operate within both the domestic and international context that is wrought with constraints or opportunities. It is also imperative to find out what literature provides as determinants of Foreign Policy. Why would states form relations?

2.4 WHAT ARE THE DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN POLICY?

This paper seeks to find out what drives Botswana-China relations. It is in that context that an interrogation of the literature on the determinants of foreign policy will be most useful.

A state may interact with other states for many reasons; “for economic resources, natural resources, military armaments, political, trade, cooperation or alliance and so forth” (Adnan, 2014:659). Another scholar, Breuning (2007:5) casts the net even wider and state that; “the foreign policy agenda does not stop with security and economic issues: in recent decades, environmental issues have increasingly gained attention; so, have issues such as human rights, population growth and migration, food and energy policies, as well as foreign aid, development, and the relations between richer and poorer countries.” What is important to learn is that there are many reasons that states will engage each other. Holsti, (1997:139) comes up with 3 categories of Foreign policy objectives;

- Core objectives: - These must be achieved all times. Sovereignty, autonomy, national interest, territorial integrity, wellbeing of people. Every state wants full autonomy and sovereignty of its own territory in order to plan out domestic and foreign policies. These objectives keep a state away from influence, coercion and the rule by other states. Acquisition of power provides influence on other states. Protection and promotion of national interest is important. These are more permanent in character. Compromise on any one of them will lead towards weakening of foreign policy.
- Middle range objectives: - These are less immediate and they require cooperation from other states like economic and social development.

Economic conditions determine the status of a state in the international arena. Economically developed states play more effective roles. Economic prosperity can be achieved through an effective foreign policy. Social development is also important. Through a successful foreign policy, states acquire economic prosperity and economic development leads towards the development of society. Not permanent, at one-time co-operation with different states may not be forever.
- Long range objectives: - These are least immediate; plans, dreams, political vision and ideology. Decision makers have enough time to think and develop and achieve these objectives. Time is no constraint, there is enough time to think, plan and implement the policy.

In Kegley & Wittkopf (1993:60), “history, culture, geostrategic location, military might, economic prowess, resource endowments, system of government and position in the international pecking order-all are mediating variables that affect foreign policy choice”. The consensus is that a multiplicity of factors affects foreign policy choice as according to this literature. Holsti (1997) differentiates between core objectives, middle range and long-range objectives whilst Kegley & Wittkopf (1993) differentiate between the international and domestic factors. They posit that, “to help determine the relative impact of these factors under different circumstances, we can first distinguish usefully between the international and domestic sources of, or influences on, national choice.” (Kegley & Wittkopf,1993:60). Next, a scrutiny of the literature of foreign policy redirection/re-orientation follows.

2.5 WHAT ARE THE CAUSES OF FOREIGN POLICY REDIRECTION/RE-ORIENTATION?

Gustavsson, (1998:3) posits that, “a central assumption in much of literature is that foreign policies tend to be rigid, that is, once a particular policy has been put in place, institutional inertia and vested interests have a stabilizing effect, making it highly resistant to change.”

Despite this inertia to change, foreign policies direction change. When do they change and why would they change? According to Jian (1996:9), regime change, state transformation and a revolution are some of the reasons a state can change its Foreign Policy course. The scholar added that most times foreign policy redirection is a self-correcting change by an incumbent government (ibid). Hermann (1990:7) gives an illuminating insight, “at the

core of this perspective on foreign policy change is the assumption that the rulers and their regime, that is, those who create governmental foreign policy, depend for their continuance on the support of certain constituencies.” This then means a change in the regime, does affect foreign policy. The constituencies have the power to determine the shift in foreign policy as their views, opinions, interests are important to the leaders and the regime.


Hermann (1990:5) explains that changes can happen in four different ways;

- adjusting changes where changes occur in the amount of effort exerted and on the number of recipients. The purpose/motive remains the same.
- Program changes and here changes are in ways the problem is addressed (handled/dealt with). These may include an introduction of new instruments of statecraft, military intervention instead of diplomatic route.
- Problem/Goal changes- The initial problem/goals are cast aside or replaced altogether.
- International Orientation changes- This type is described as the most extreme as the actor’s entire orientation towards world affairs is changed.

Hermann (1990:13), governments change their foreign policy through a decision-making process. That is for a change to occur in Foreign policy direction, agents must act on the government decision process.

Gustavsson (1998:27) presents a model which explains Foreign policy change as a result of simultaneous changes in the fundamental structural conditions, strategic leadership, the presence of some crisis. The scholar argues that none of the existing models include all three conditions in their explanation. Gustavsson's model as adapted (see figure 2) explained the interplay of the three conditions to effect change in foreign policy but adapts Hermann's model to show that change can happen in the four ways as described by Hermann (1990).

As adapted in Gustavsson (1999 :85), (Gustavsson,1998:25);



In simpler terms, Gustavsson (1999) argues that both international and domestic factors affect an individual decision maker who takes in both factors to the decision-making process and the resulting change will happen in the four ways that Herman (1990) has described. The feedback arrows

mean that change that will happen can also affect both the international and domestic environment causing another round of foreign policy change. (Gustavsson,1999:85).

As this research intends to scrutinise Sino-Botswana relations, it is imperative at this stage to look into China's Foreign policy.

2.6 CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY

China's Foreign policy is termed as "independent Foreign Policy of peace" and according to Jian (1996:1) "the foreign policy was adopted to help China create a stable international environment favourable to China's economic modernisation drive". It is perhaps important to note that the independent Foreign policy was only adopted in 1982 (Jian, 1996:1; Anshan, 2007:72). The core objective of China's Foreign policy "since 1949 has been to regain the respect and dignity of being a great nation that it has lost" (Weissmann, 2015:152). China has chosen to stay away from controversy and has generally been risk averse in international issues. The only exception is when it feels its sovereignty maybe encroached that is when it is active and vigilant. The issues of Taiwan, Tibet, Xinjiang and the South China Sea are such examples (Weissmann, 2015:159).

2.6.1 CHINA IN AFRICA

As discussed in the background, relations between China and Africa are not entirely new. The relations have over decades went through different phases and epochs. Literature does show that at different times, different

determinants have driven the relations. Sun (2014) alluding to the start of relations to the 1955 Bandung conference explains the different phases of the relations. It is explained that during the cold war, Africa's position became more important in China's Foreign policy. It stated that in the 1950's and 1960's, "China intended to rally broad international support to penetrate isolation imposed by the Soviet Union and the US" (Sun,2014:25). To reiterate Sun's assertion Mlambo etal (2016) also agrees that the 1950's and 1960's was a time that China's interest was at a high in Africa. China assisted African liberation movements, through provision of military support and training and the economic relations were limited (ibid). In support, Sun (2014) gives an example of how China gave aid to Africa despite its own problems during the cold war and the Cultural revolution, the famous Tanzania-Zambia (TAZARA) railway was built during this era. From the Cold war right through the Cultural revolution, China's interest in Africa was clearly on a high. In summation, Anshan (2007:70) states that, "the trajectory of Sino-African relations went through several fundamental shifts...". The scholar explains that from the birth of PRC to 1978 China's policy was influenced by ideology, later on by political pragmatism and the current relationship is based on economic pragmatism (Anshan,2007:74).

The turning point in the foreign policy of China towards Africa is generally believed to have emanated from the Deng era. Taylor (2006;443), states that, "after 1978, China Foreign Policy was largely dedicated to fostering the economic modernisation programme begun under the auspices of Deng, and though remaining friendly to Africa, China was preoccupied with economic

matters”. In their quest for economic modernisation, China’s interest in Africa waned. The loss of interest was evident in the amount of trade between China and Africa as well as the amount of aid it gave in comparison to during both the Cold War and Cultural revolution. Taylor (2006:444) argues that, “With Africa experiencing the ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s and Chinese economic attention firmly directed towards Japan and the United States, Sino-African trade was increasingly marginalised. Though they maintained (and in some years increased) their general level, trade figures remained unremarkable and subject to high degrees of fluctuation”.

It is believed that it is was the 4th June 1989, Tiananmen square incident that brought Africa back into China’s orbit of interest. While the West condemned China for human rights violations, it was Africa that offered solidarity. Sun (2014:5) notes that it was Botswana, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Angola, Zambia and Mozambique that saved China by inviting Chinese Foreign minister for official visits in August 1989. Taylor (1998:446) argues it was this support that compelled China to once again reevaluate its foreign policy towards Africa.

For Mlambo (2016:269), China’s foreign policy towards Africa changed considerably after 2000. It is in 2000 that China institutionalised its relationship with Africa through the establishment of the Forum of China and Africa cooperation (FOCAC) held amidst pomp and fanfare in Beijing (ibid). The forum came up with two important documents; Beijing declaration of the Forum on China-Africa cooperation and Sino-African cooperation guidelines for socio-economic Development served as framework

for building long-term, stable and mutually beneficial relations (Hinga et al ,2013:27). Tangible political institutions have been setup to consolidate China's increasing commercial ties with Africa. Corkin (2012;63) posits that, "the establishment of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) has provided a diplomatic platform through which strategic largescale investment deals are facilitated". Following FOCAC establishment it is claimed, that, "statistics show that trade between China and Africa increased by 681% in the period from 2001 to 2007" (ibid).

What are the central tenets of China's Foreign policy towards Africa? In this current era, post-cold war, what drives China- Africa relations? As stipulated in China's Africa policy, China intends to base its relations with Africa on principles of independence, equality, mutual respect and non-interference in each other's internal affairs (China's Africa Policy,2006:4). This according to Taylor (2006:1) stems from a long held believe by China that it has been denied its glory by hegemony and hence, "constructed a fairly consistent foreign policy aimed at preventing or limiting the development of hegemony, whilst at the same time trying to carve out space for itself as its economy continues to grow."

Mlambo et al (2016:271) conclude that the four key elements of China's Foreign Policy objectives towards Africa are:

- China needs access to African resources (resource seeking)
- Political support: China depends on African countries in the international arena (diplomatic support);

- Africa still offers an attractive market for Chinese goods/services (market seeking); and
- Africa offers an attractive market for investment opportunities (investment).

For Pere (2008:32), “China’s core interests will increasingly bind it to Africa: it needs resources for its growth and modernisation, it needs markets to sustain its growing economy and it requires political alliances to support its global ambitions. Mlambo et al (2016:271) further argues that both China and Africa need each other and because of that Africa has a leverage to use for its benefit. China needs Africa’s resources, diplomatic support, trade, and investment.

Corkin (2011:67) buttresses the idea and goes on to quote (Brautigam, 2009: 53-54; Dong, 2009: 92) who also believe contemporary relations between China and Africa are based on economic gains unlike during the Cold-War period where they were characterised by solidarity rhetoric. Conversely, Africa needs China for developmental purposes, Africa needs China’s assistance to finance its infrastructure, aid, and also for diplomatic support. In a nutshell Corkin recommended that it is up to Africa to even relations; identify priorities, encourage equitable trade and investment, stop inflow of substandard goods, preserve and promote its interests and revise mineral policies (Ibid).

Sun (2014:1) finds that a simplistic perception by most literature that Africa is merely a supplier of raw materials neglects other key aspects of China’s

global strategy. The author suggest that China seeks to satisfy four broad national interests;

- Politically, China seeks Africa's support for China's "One China" policy and for its foreign policy agendas in multilateral forums such as the United Nations.
- Economically, Africa is seen primarily as a source of natural resources and market opportunities to fuel China's domestic growth.
- From a security standpoint, the rising presence of Chinese commercial interests in Africa has led to growing security challenges for China, as the safety of Chinese investments and personnel come under threats due to political instability and criminal activities on the ground.
- China also sees an underlying ideological interest in Africa, as the success of the "China model" in non-democratic African countries offers indirect support for China's own political ideology and offers evidence that Western democratic ideals are not universal.

Sun (2014:2) argues that though Africa does play a part in China's foreign policy, compared to other regions, Africa is not as important. The paper argues that Africa is too far as in geographical distance to threaten China in its territorial challenges, China's economic interests are too small as compared to other parts of the world, Africa only accounts for 5% of the whole volume of trade. It is for that reason that Foreign policy making for Africa has been left on the hands of MFA and MOFCOM not the Politburo,

“only decisions on ‘strategically important’ issues, such as the relationship with the United States or tension with China’s neighbours, almost without exception reach the level of the FAO, and sometimes require decision making from the paramount leader, the PBSC or even the PB” (ibid). This study does not seek to compare the China-Africa relations with those that China has with the rest of the world. In this study the relations that China and Botswana have are under scrutiny.

China’s aid to Africa is also seen a key part of China’s Foreign policy towards Africa. In China’s second Foreign aid white paper of July 2014, the paper boldly asserts that, “infrastructure has always been the focus of China’s assistance to Africa,” (China’s Second Foreign aid white paper, 2014). It is even clearer in China’s very first foreign aid white paper of 2011 (p 5), exactly how important infrastructure development is to China. In the paper it was reported that 61% of China’s global concessional loans were dedicated to the construction of transportation, communications and electricity infrastructure. Renzio etal (2013:2), asserts very boldly that, “Chinese development cooperation in Africa has been praised for its focus on infrastructure, a sector from which Northern and multilateral donors have distanced themselves in the last decades.”

Brautigam (2009:15) “Like the US, China gives aid for three reasons: strategic diplomacy, commercial benefit and as a reflection of society’s ideologies and values” Brautigam also brings about the concept of soft power as a deliberate and strategic act by China to package itself as an attractive political partner. “Beijing needed to make its aid and other forms of what

Harvard professor Joseph Nye has called “soft power” much more visible” writes Brautigam (2009:87). One can deduce from the statement that Brautigam sees China’s aid as part of its soft power. In other words, the role of Chinese aid to Africa is to enhance its soft power. China’s aid model is referred to as the Beijing consensus and it is said to be different from the Washington’s consensus. The writer concludes that The Beijing consensus is all about experimentation not certainties like the Washington consensus, (Brautigam, 2009:16.)

In a nutshell the arguments from literature are that contemporary Chinese Foreign policy towards Africa is driven by; a need for resources, access to markets, investment opportunities, China needs Africa’s political support in various multilateral organisations, Africa is being used to champion the ‘China model” and because of the growing Chinese investments in Africa, security is now an important driver. China has also continuously used aid to enhance its soft power which is essential to ensure that which China needs it will get.

Below follows an illustration of the origins of Botswana’s foreign policy and factors that are believed to be influential to its formulation as well as implementation as discussed in various literature.

2.7 BOTSWANA’S FOREIGN POLICY

As it is already alluded to, Botswana at independence had adopted an independent foreign policy. This was necessitated by the precarious situation, that it found itself in. Niemann (1993) explains that, “even when the Bechuanaland territories were being prepared for independence, as late

as 1959 Prime Minister of South Africa, Hendrick Frensch Verwoerd demanded the incorporation of Bechuanaland into the Union of South Africa. It was a widely held belief that self-government of Bechuanaland will amount to a mere formality as Bechuanaland was heavily dependent on South Africa for virtually everything". Even after gaining independence its woes had not ended, in addition to the South African dilemma, its other neighbours were also white minority ruled states; Southern Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe), as well as the South West Africa (present day Namibia) (Neimann,1993).

In addition, this was during a time (Cold War) when relations were influenced by ideology over everything else. This was made even dire by the fact that Botswana is landlocked and hence more dependent on her neighbours than she desired. Therefore, Botswana's Foreign Policy was highly determined by its geopolitical situation and cold war politics.

Motsamai, (2015:3) finds that Botswana's foreign policy is based on the 8 principles postulated by its founding father Sir Seretse Khama namely:

- democracy: this referred to establishing relations with democratic countries and jointly pursuing democratic ideals and encompassed the peaceful resolution of conflict, self-determination and the provision of refuge to victims of racial oppression;
- development: the focus was on attracting development assistance and foreign direct investment. emphasis was on supporting initiatives that promoted a more equitable world trading system as well as protecting Botswana's infant industries;

- African unity and non-alignment: this were about diversifying relations with many countries, while supporting unity on the continent;
- self-reliance: strategies included reducing excessive dependence on external aid, negotiating aid ‘without strings’ and forging closer bilateral, regional and south-south relations;
- good neighbourliness: mostly within the region, with emphasis on peaceful coexistence with South Africa;
- peaceful resolution of conflicts;
- territorial integrity; and
- respect for the sovereignty of all nations

However, it is during President Ian Khama’s tenure that additional principles were brought forth. When he came into power, he announced the 5D’s being; democracy, dignity, development, discipline and delivery. “These are the principles that are believed to have also guided the foreign policy of his tenure” (Motsamai, 2015:10). Motsamai (2015; 3) quotes one Gaeimelwe Goitsewang, Deputy Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation, who said that the country still adheres to original tenets with some added caveats. “These include providing greater support for multilateralism and regional integration. Botswana also aims to promote: international goodwill and friendship; international co-operation; trade, investment and tourism; peace, growth and development. The country also

wants to integrate foreign policy more concretely in its national development agenda” (ibid).

2.7.1 The Role of Presidents in the Botswana-China Relations

In discussing Botswana’s foreign policy, it is of paramount importance to scrutinise the role that presidents play/ed in the Botswana-China relations because the Presidency has been seen to dominate foreign policy making. The Constitution explicitly states that, “the President, shall act in his/her own deliberate judgement and shall not be obliged to follow the advice of any other person or authority.” (Constitution of the Republic of Botswana, S .47(2). Mogalakwe & Nyamnjoh (2017:3) state that, “the powers of the President of Botswana are as old as the Constitution of Botswana”. They cite Sections 41, 47 and 92 of the Constitution which they find to have given the Presidency extensive powers. For example, “Section 41 of the Constitution gives the sitting President absolute immunity from criminal and civil proceedings” (Ibid). They further state that, “Section 92 of the Constitution empowers the President to dissolve a democratically elected Parliament, even though the President himself is not democratically or popularly elected” (Mogalakwe & Nyamnjoh, 2017:4). Efforts to detach parliament from the Office of the President, first failed in March 1988 during President Masire’s administration (Mogalakwe & Nyamnjoh, 2017:4). The motion was brought back in 2002, and a Task Force was appointed to look into the motion. “Its recommendations were tabled in Parliament in 2004, but were shot down by President Mogae’s executive” (Molomo 2012 in Mogalakwe & Nyamnjoh, 2017:4).

In Motsamai, (2015:4) Office of the President (OP), Ministry of Finance and Development Planning (MFDP), Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (MoFAIC) and the Botswana Parliament are credited as the main actors in Botswana's Foreign Policy. MOFAIC "coordinates activities of the groups, agencies, committees participating in the formulation and execution of Foreign Policy" (ibid). Motsamai (2015:4) further explains that because of the extensive powers that the Constitution of Botswana gives to the Presidency, the OP has played a central role in setting the country's foreign policy agenda. "This centrality is consistent with the powers conferred to the President by Botswana's Constitution, which vests executive power in the institution of the Presidency" (ibid).

The country has since independence had five Presidents, including the current one, Dr Mokgweetsi Eric Keabetswe Masisi, who took seat on the 1st April 2018. In particular, the relationship between Botswana and China have gone through different epochs since formation. In Youngman (2017:39), it was found that, "for many respondents there was a perception that the relationship has declined during the current Presidency and specifically since 2013 when the President and senior members of the Botswana government became publicly critical of the Chinese". For better appreciation, the paper will look into the state of relations during the tenure of Lt. General Dr Seretse Khama Ian Khama and the three presidencies before him. The drivers for each tenure of the Presidencies, as well as the role played by an unwritten foreign policy document will be discussed.

2.7.1 (i) Sir Seretse Khama (1965-1980)

Diplomatic relations between Botswana and China were established on the 6th January, 1975 which means it was during the first President's tenure, Sir Seretse Khama (1965-1980). Prior to that, Botswana had formed diplomatic ties with Taiwan. However, its geopolitical position left the country with no choice but to ditch Taiwan in favour of China. Botswana was then sandwiched by unfriendly white minority ruled states and had only one black ruled neighbour state, Zambia (Taylor,2006:182, Youngman,2013:5). "As a result, Botswana aimed to lessen dependence on the minority-ruled countries and sought political support from fellow 'Front-Line' states – particularly Zambia" (Taylor,2006:182). Botswana formed close relations with Zambia in an effort to break off its complete dependence on apartheid South Africa. "It is that relationship that made Botswana amenable to links with non-capitalist states such as Yugoslavia and China" (Ibid). Whilst still diplomatic partners with Taiwan, the first President, Sir Seretse Khama, over-rode the objections of his Cabinet, and ensured that Botswana voted in favour of the PRC for United Nations Security Council permanent seat in 1971 (Bolaane, 2007:146). With a constitution that empowers him to make unilateral decisions, the first President took a decision that has been instrumental to the start of the Botswana-China relations.

It is the Botswana-Zambia relations that encouraged diplomatic relations between Botswana and China. This is buttressed by a now declassified Cabinet Memorandum presented by Minister Kgari, the then Minister of

State, available at the Botswana National Records titled, '*Position paper on Botswana's relations with the People's Republic of China and Taiwan*'. It states that, "the Chinese have behaved perfectly in both Tanzania and Zambia; and this view has been supported by both Presidents Nyerere and Kaunda who have at different times informed the President of how well-behaved and helpful the Chinese have been in their respective countries" (Botswana National Archives and Records; CAB.MEM/317, 1974 annex a: 2).

In considering diplomatic partnership with China, Botswana weighed options and the main determinant was how South Africa would respond to Botswana and China's friendship (Botswana National Archives and Records; 1974, Cab memo 317). Botswana was considerably cautious in her Foreign Policy behaviours so as not to offend her neighbour. Niemann (1993) describes the governing principle of Botswana's Foreign Policy as "maintaining a precarious balance between avoiding any action that would appear to support white minority rule and avoiding action which would give South Africa reason to intervene". After careful consideration, Botswana and China entered into a diplomatic partnership in 1975. Sir Seretse Khama first visited China in 1976 and following the visit, technical cooperation started between the two countries (Taylor,1998). The first President was again "in China in August 1977, where he signed agreements on technical cooperation relating to railroad maintenance" (Bolaane, 2007:156).

In the first visit to China Sir Seretse Khama is quoted to have admitted that "Gaborone's geographical position in the area is such that our survival as a

nation depends almost entirely on our neighbours whose policies are diametrically antithetical to our own” (New China Agency, July 28, 1976 in Taylor, 1998:79). It is also during the first President’s tenure that China supported United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions 403 and 406 against acts of harassment from Southern Rhodesia (white-minority ruled Rhodesia) and appealed on behalf of Botswana for member states and organizations to assist the country in anyway possible (http://www.un.org/eng/ga.search/vie_doc.asp?symbol=s/RES/403 (1977)). From the literature one can conclude that, during Sir Seretse Khama’s tenure the relations between Botswana and China were driven by geopolitical issues and Cold War politics. The relations were seemingly strong but nascent relations.

2.7.1 (ii) Sir Ketumile Masire (1980-1998)

When the first President died in 1980, his vice then, Dr Quett Ketumile Joni (Q.K.J.) Masire took over as President. Just like his predecessor, Sir Ketumile Masire (1980-1998) continued the good relations with China and visited the country in November 1983 and September 1991 (Bolaane, 2007). In a declassified speech made by him at a state banquet hosted in his honour by His Excellency Li Xiannian on the 14th November 1983, the President unequivocally reiterated Botswana’s Foreign Policy. He stated that, “Botswana just like the People’s Republic of China, pursues the policy of equality and peaceful co-existence in international relations. We depreciate interference in the internal affairs of other countries as well as the use of

force in resolving differences between states” (Botswana National Archives and Records, 1983: 6).

During Masire’s tenure noticeable projects like the rehabilitation of the railway by the Chinese started in 1985. According to Chen (2009:4) China Civil Engineering Construction Company (CCECC) came to Botswana in 1985 to rehabilitate the railway line as an aid project. The first medical aid team is said to have also come to Botswana during Masire’s tenure in 1981 (Chinese Embassy website,2018).

There is also evidence that cooperation in education started during Masire’s tenure. According to the Chinese Embassy website (2018), “during the period of 1984 to 2005, China provided 5 scholarships per year to Botswana students. The number was further increased to 12 in 2006, 21 in 2007, 22 in 2008 and 27 in 2009”. Botswana and China also have cultural cooperation that is said to have started in 1991. Since then, cultural delegations, performing art troupes and exhibition groups have visited each other and gave splendid performances (Chinese Embassy website, 2018).

It is also important to mention that it is during Masire’s presidency, that Botswana showed support to China during one of its challenging times by inviting China for an official visit when the West turned their back on China and castigated it for the 1989 Tiananmen events. Sun, (2014; 4) states that, “it was six countries in Southern Africa (Botswana, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Angola, Zambia and Mozambique) that stepped up and saved China from the quagmire by inviting Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen to visit in August 1989”. The Tiananmen Square event was criticised all over but

Botswana under President Masire, a democratic country supported China when it was accused of the worst human rights violations. One wonders again what informed this stand? With no written Foreign Policy strategy one can only assume that President Masire reacted on an ad hoc basis.

The main drivers of the relations during this time were aid (medical and construction projects) and political issues as evidenced by President Masire's support after the Tiananmen Square event as well as visits by officials of both countries. Examples given show a good diplomatic relationship between the two countries during Masire's time as the foreign policy champion for Botswana.

In 1998, Sir Masire stepped down and his deputy, Dr Festus Mogae (1998-2008) took over as the new President.

2.7.1(iii) Dr Festus Gontebanye Mogae (1998-2008)

During Dr Festus Gontebanye Mogae's presidency good relations continued. His tenure coincided with the beginning of a new era of relations between China and Africa. In 2000, China established the Forum of China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and President Mogae was among the African Presidents who attended the inaugural FOCAC meeting in Beijing. As part of FOCAC commitments, the Letlhakeng-Kang highway was constructed, and a housing project consisting of 424 affordable houses were built in 2005 (Chen,2009:7). The road was built in phases. The first phase in 2003 and the second in 2006 (Bolaane,2007:162). "On the 3rd of December 2007, China and Botswana signed a 10 million RMB (8.1 million Pula) grant agreement on the construction of two primary schools as part of the FOCAC

commitments as well” (Chinese Embassy website,2018). Chinese Ambassador to Botswana Mr Ding Xiaowen and Botswana Finance Minister Mr Baledzi Gaolathe signed on behalf of their respective governments (ibid).

It is evident that good relations existed between the two countries and one such example is a meeting that was held between the leaders of the two countries ahead of the summit of the Forum on China-Africa cooperation (FOCAC). President Mogae met Chinese President Hu Jintao at the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, on 2nd November, 2006 ahead of the FOCAC Summit which was scheduled for 4th -5th November, 2006. During their meeting, Jintao emphasised that they, “are willing to deepen mutual understanding and trust, widen bilateral cooperation in economy, trade, culture, education and health, and strengthen coordination and cooperation between China and Botswana in international affairs to maintain the common interests of developing countries” (Chinese Embassy website, 2018). President Mogae had replied by saying, “FOCAC has set a good example for the South-South cooperation and the Beijing Summit will improve Africa's relations with China as well as its ties with countries in other regions” (ibid).

The following year, on the 8th January 2007, the Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing was in Botswana as part of his 7 African countries tour (https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zjzg_663340/fzs_663828/xwlb_663830/t288095.shtml). President Festus Mogae once again expressed approval of good relations and the cooperation that existed between the two countries. He said, “it is tradition for the two countries to

exchange views on issues of common concern through high-level reciprocal visits” (ibid). The Sunday Standard (18th November,2006) reported that Mogae had during an interview with a British journalist, Lindsay Hilsum, declared that, “i find that the Chinese treat us as equals. The West treats us as former subjects, which is a reality. I prefer the attitude of the Chinese to the West’s,”. Mogae spoke highly of China which is a testament of the state of relations between the two countries during his presidency. It is also not surprising that with no written foreign policy document Presidents can tend to make such strong personal sentiments. This is a comparison between the West and China which one can wonder what informed it; clearly the President’s own personal emotions.

Despite the seemingly good political relations, there was evidence that domestic constituents, media and members of the public were unhappy with the Chinese. In Bolaane (2007, 165) the scholar found out that “some Batswana were not happy and felt that Chinese businesses have not created jobs and that the goods they sell are of inferior quality”. One can conclude that, during Mogae’s tenure relations with China were characterised by infrastructure projects financed by the Chinese soft loans and increased trade volumes, which can also be seen as an attestation of good relations between the two countries.

2.7.1 (iv) Lt. General Dr Seretse Khama Ian Khama (2008-2018)

In 2008, President Lt. General Dr Seretse Khama Ian Khama took over from President Mogae and it is during his tenure that reports of tensions in the relations gained momentum. Prominent politicians as well as the President

himself were reported in different media to have openly criticised China. Moahi (2015:63) observes that, "... in recent times the leadership of the country has also come out strongly against the disappointing work done by Chinese companies on various public sector projects." In response to the failure of the Morupule power project Khama openly put the blame on China. He is quoted to have said that, "were it not for delays and problems with the Chinese-constructed power plant Botswana would be totally self-sufficient"

(<http://africanpresidentialcentre.wordpress.com/201304/17/bots-says-no-to-China/>).

In the same vein, President Ian Khama also hinted to Business Day that companies originating from China might not get tenders in the future as he does not trust their workmanship. He was quoted to have said, "we have had some bad experiences with Chinese companies in this country. . . . We are going to be looking very carefully at any company that originates from China in providing construction services of any nature" (Business Day Live, February 20, 2013.) There is an institution responsible for awarding tenders, The Public Procurement and Assets Disposal Board (PPADB), but a sitting President announces that Chinese companies might not get tenders in the future. In this case, the President had made a statement informed by his own personal sentiments.

At the time, President Lt. General Dr Seretse Khama Ian Khama made the remarks, Botswana was going through the worst power shortages. In an effort to address the energy insecurity the Botswana Government embarked

on construction of the Morupule B. “China National Electric Engineering Company(CNEEC) was contracted to build, maintain and operate Morupule B Power Station and the works for the project started in June 2009 and the four 150 MW generation units were scheduled to come online sequentially between January and October 2012” (African Development Bank Report, 2009). However, Morupule B never met the specified timelines (ibid). The failure of the Morupule B left the country in the worst energy insecurity in its history. According to the KPMG Power in Africa Sector Report, in 2012 Botswana recorded the largest electricity deficit in Africa, attributing it to a drop-in electricity generation combined with a rise in electricity consumption over the past decade. “The deficit amounted to over 90% of the country’s total electricity consumption over the year” (ibid). Much of the problems experienced at the power station have been attributed to, “the inexperience of the contractor, (CNEEC) in the power station construction, resulting in the plant being plagued by regular boiler failures leading to widespread power cuts” (BPC Annual Report,2014).

In response opposition politicians had organized protests in Gaborone in an attempt to get the Government to act on the issues of energy shortage. “Opposition politicians went further to call for an urgent motion requesting Parliament to task the Statutory Bodies and State Enterprises Committee to investigate the current water and power crises in the country with no success as the majority of the ruling party members voted against the motion” (Botswana Daily News, 8 July 2015). With the failure of the motion, The Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC) organised a march

demonstrating against the shortage of water and power on the 4th September 2015 (Botswana Daily News, 6thSeptember 2015). The state-owned Daily News (13th October,2015), also reported that according to Statistics Botswana, “on a quarter to quarter, the economy recorded a decrease of 0.4 per cent as electricity demand continued to outstrip supply.” Statistics Botswana illustrated that “real GDP went up by 2.5 per cent in 2015 compared to 3.4 per cent realised in the first quarter of 2014” (ibid). The contract between Botswana Power Corporation and CNEEC was later terminated by Government following a deadlock between the parties as the, “Government could not establish why the Chinese company was experiencing repeated failures, and whether the company followed set specifications and procedures in constructing the plant” (Botswana Daily News,2014). “Apart from an easing in the first seven months of 2016, Botswana has faced restrictive electricity supply since 2008 with frequent breakdowns at Morupule B meaning on average it has only run at about a third of its capacity” (<http://africachinareporting.co.za/2016/09/will-a-new-era-of-china-africa-relations-power-up-botswana>). This is how dire the situation was.

The Chinese projects were also discussed at the highest oversight body, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC), where Honourable Samson Guma Moyo (MP), expressed how Batswana were unhappy about the Chinese projects and demanded an explanation. Members of the PAC also inquired on the outcome of Pelonomi Venson-Moitoi’s Beijing visit where on the agenda was

project delays and failures (<http://africachinareporting.co.za/2016/09/will-a-new-era-of-china-africa-relations-power-up-botswana>).

Responding to the PAC members, Deputy Permanent Secretary in the Foreign Affairs Ministry responsible for international relations, Mr. Thuso Ramodimoosi said, “some Chinese contractors performing poorly should not result in generalisations against all Chinese contractors. Painting all of them with the same brush will be wrong” (ibid). Ramodimoosi maintained that no diplomatic tiff existed between Gaborone and Beijing over poor projects execution. Clifford Maribe another Foreign Affairs official also confirmed his colleague assertion that no diplomatic tiff existed between Botswana and China. Following Minister Venson-Moitoi’s visit to China, Maribe had told Sunday Standard (05th July ,2015) that it was important to note that, “the Chinese Government does not have control over such companies and reiterated that relations remain cordial”. In addition to PAC discussions, the then Minister of Infrastructure, Science and Technology, Johnnie Swartz also undertook a countrywide mission to assess the progress of major public works. “The mission was motivated by concerns by Cabinet, the country’s top decision-making body, with the quality of projects by Chinese contractors”(<http://africachinareporting.co.za/2016/09/will-a-new-era-of-china-africa-relations-power-up-botswana>).

It was also during President Khama’s presidency that Botswana took a position against China openly regarding the South China Sea. Botswana issued a press statement advising that the row at South China Sea is best resolved by international platforms. The statement read, “no country, no

matter how big its economy or military should impose its power over others or to make claims, which may escalate tensions that could result in conflicts” (<https://www.facebook.com/permalonk.php?>). The stance on South China Sea by Botswana is a clear criticism to the actions of China on the South China Sea. This is a contrast to previous foreign policy towards China or any other country. Botswana as described by Taylor (1998;81) “pursued an independent foreign policy, where it preferred to stay as far as possible to controversial issues”.

Just on the heels of the South China Sea statement, in July 2017 the Botswana Government had granted The Dalai Lama visa to visit and speak at a Botho conference. A move that clearly affected the Botswana-China relations, the media was rife about the displeasure of the Chinese. The matter was even raised at Parliament by Member of Parliament, Honourable D. L. Keorapetse (Selibe Phikwe West). Below is the excerpt from the parliament exchange between Honourable Keorapetse and the Minister of International Affairs and Cooperation: Mr Keorapetse asked the Minister, “(i) to state if Government in its foreign policy recognises One China Policy, and to explain its understanding of what it means and/or entails regarding South China Sea, Taiwan and Tibet (and the Dalai Lama) inter alia;” (<https://www.facebook.com/ThePatriotOnSunday/posts/1454772911278107>)

In response, the then, Minister of International Affairs and Cooperation, DR Venson-Moitoi stated that;

“our understanding of the One China Policy is that there is but only one sovereign state called the Peoples’ Republic of China, despite the existence of two governments that claim to be “China”. As a policy, this means that countries which intend entering into diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China must sever official relations with Taiwan and vice versa.

However, our understanding of the One China Policy does not include South China Sea, as it is a disputed area. This is the reason why Botswana has been advocating for the concerned parties to resolve the matter through arbitration with international institutions set up for such purposes. Regarding Taiwan and Tibet, I wish to underscore that whilst Botswana regards the two as an integral part of the People’s Republic of China, the Taiwanese and Tibetans, are free to visit Botswana in their private capacities” (<https://www.facebook.com/ThePatriotOnSunday/posts/1454772911278107>).

In retaliation, China issued a press statement published in the Chinese Embassy website, the Chinese clearly made it known that by Botswana letting The Dalai Lama into Botswana “was allowing him to continue with his anti-China separatist activities by offering him a stage to do just that”. The statement went further to state that, “by so doing the Botswana government is interfering in China’s own internal affairs” (<http://bw.China-embassy.org>).

Amidst everything else, following the FOCAC held in Johannesburg in December, 2015, Botswana submitted a preliminary plan for assistance dominated by energy and infrastructure projects, (<http://africachinareporting.co.za/2016/09/will-a-new-era-of-china-africa-relations-power-up-botswana>). Tang Shenping, Director of the Political Section at the Chinese Embassy in Gaborone confirmed that Botswana partners have sought assistance in the energy, manufacturing and infrastructure sectors (ibid).

Despite the tension discussed, relations continued between Botswana and China. “The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Relations maintains that diplomatic ties with Beijing have not reached a low, despite acknowledging that Chinese contractors have been blamed for poor project performance at Morupule B and other major public works” (<http://africachinareporting.co.za/2016/09/will-a-new-era-of-china-africa-relations-power-up-botswana/>).

2.8 The Gap in Literature

This study notices the gap in the literature on Botswana-China relations. The current literature appears to attribute the current re-orientation of Botswana’s Foreign Policy towards China on a single factor; Khama and his Presidency. Is it the only factor that could be a cause of a re-orientation of Botswana’s Foreign policy towards China? As already postulated, “leaders do not exist in a vacuum; they are surrounded by advisors and a bureaucracy, influenced by domestic constituencies, and dependent on the power their state can project in the international arena” (Breuning, 2007:6). Therefore,

the best explanations of the foreign policy process lie in the complex interplay of multiple factors. This is what the research intends to find out.

The literature (Chen, 2009; Bolaane 2007; Youngman 2013; Moahi 2015) explains the differences between Botswana and China and conclude that it is the economic sphere; poor workmanship in some construction works and ‘inferior’ products that are the problematic areas. This is another gap as there is clearly other problems in the relationship. The South China Sea and The Dalai lama’ s positions by Botswana are clearly Foreign policy issues and the Chinese embassy have gone on record stating that by granting The Dalai Lama visa the “the Botswana government is interfering in China’s own internal affairs” (<http://bw.China-embassy.org>).

Perhaps this is where the current literature should be probing from.

2.9 CHAPTER SUMMARY

In the literature review chapter, the main intention was to situate the research in the literature. To achieve that, literature on the foreign policy theoretical framework was scrutinised. What are the main International Relations theories propagating as compared to Foreign Policy Analysis? In addition, the research also intends to explain the current foreign policy shift between the two countries. For that purpose, an analysis on the literature of foreign policy redirection/re-orientation was done. The chapter also looked into the literature of the foreign policy of Botswana and China, the characteristics, actors as well as the process of foreign policy making in Botswana.

The following chapter will explain how the research will be carried out, how data will be collected and what kind of data will be collected and most importantly why some methods of data collection were chosen over others.

CHAPTER 3

3.0 RESEARCH STRATEGY

3.1 OVERVIEW

The chapter on methodology will discuss the chosen type for the research. It will further explain the sources of data as well as methods used for collection of same. It will also discuss how the validity and reliability of the data will be improved.

3.1.1 METHODOLOGY

The approach taken is qualitative research. Creswell (1998:15) defines qualitative research as, “an inquiry process of understanding based on distinct methodological traditions of inquiry that explore a social or human problem. The researcher builds a complex, holistic picture, analyses words, reports detailed views of informants, and conducts the study in a natural setting.

The paper seeks to answer this important question: what are the main drivers of the Botswana-China relations? Creswell (1998:15) reiterates that in a qualitative study research questions often start with how or what. In this study the researcher intends to describe the relations between the two; Botswana and China. Walliman (2006:7) argued that in some of the tasks of social science, official statistics and survey may be inappropriate as they exclude the observation of behaviour in everyday situations. This means that not all areas of social reality can be measured quantitatively.

3.1.2 SOURCES OF DATA

The researcher will use secondary sources of data to analyse the relations between Botswana and China. Data was sourced from the Botswana National Records and Archives. This is a Government department that stores Government records, the official websites of both countries (Botswana and China), Facebook page of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (now Ministry of International Affairs and cooperation-MIAC) as well as the Official Government of Botswana Facebook page. The other data was collected from books, journals, texts, newspapers, internet and magazines.

To get current information on the relations between the two the researcher relied more on journal articles, internet sources mainly, Government websites as well as government social network sites. The intention was also to show how the relations between the two have evolved from before the relations to present time and for that the researcher relied on archived government documents, newspaper articles as well as textbooks and journal articles.

As is a common problem for most governments some information was not readily available in Government official publications and for that more current information was gathered from newspaper articles, Government websites as well as peer reviewed scholarly journals. The researcher preferred scholarly journals than newspaper articles. This is because journal articles go through a rigorous exercise of vetting before an article can be

published which imply that when an article has been finally published its validity can at least be trusted. This is emphasized in Walliman (2006:53) when the writer advises that, “for detailed and authoritative information on almost any subject, go to refereed journals-all the papers will have been vetted by leading experts in the subject.” This then improves the validity and reliability of the research as verifiable sources of data are used.

Neuman (2014) does not completely disregard newspapers and hence notes that, “a researcher might use them as a source on current events...” In the Botswana-China relations there are a lot of current issues and hence newspapers were helpful. Most importantly, the use of multiple sources improves reliability and validity of the information collected. Berg (2000:469) asserts that, “multiple sources allow for triangulation through conversing lines of inquiry, improving the reliability and validity of the data and findings.”

3.1.3 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS

With internet sources, the researcher is aware of misgivings regarding validity and for that reason the aim was to use verifiable Government websites as well as academic journals. Berg e tal (2014:29) cautions that though the internet is fast and provides access to millions of users, the quality of the data is suspect. However, they highlight that government and reputable organizations do have official, verifiable websites, electronic books and journals that can be accessed. (ibid)

3.1.4 LIMITATIONS

It was difficult for the researcher to find current information from government publications or websites on the Botswana-Botswana relations and had to use other sources like newspapers and social media pages. For example, there is no Government publication that lists all the bilateral agreements between Botswana and China.

3.2 CHAPTER SUMMARY

This study will use the qualitative research methodology as stated earlier. Both primary and secondary sources of data will be scrutinised in the hope to answer the research questions.

CHAPTER 4

4.0 PRESENTATION OF DATA

4.1 OVERVIEW

For purposes of data presentation, the research questions will be categorised into themes. The broader themes are; drivers of the Botswana-China relations, current status of relations between Botswana and China and the determinants of the current relations. The findings are that as a result of a President who enjoys extensive presidential powers (foreign policy included) and with no unwritten foreign policy document to circumvent those powers, operating in a changed domestic and international environment the foreign policy behaviour and direction towards China was oriented.

4.1.1 DRIVERS OF THE BOTSWANA-CHINA RELATIONS

Reynolds (1980:35) postulates that, “a policy is not simply a range of actions but also the principles influencing those actions as well as the purposes they are intended to serve”. Principles as well as purposes, is what this paper defines as drivers. What are the principles and purposes that the Botswana’s Foreign Policy towards China intends to achieve? What are the main drivers of the Botswana-China relations? What does Botswana benefit from the relationship? What are the goals behind the relations? These are the drivers. From the literature it is clear that the main drivers of the Botswana-China relations can be categorised into political, economic and

aid (infrastructure, medical, education). These are the drivers that can be said to have determined the state of relations during all the Presidents' tenures but maybe to differing degrees. As discussed in Chapter 2, during the first President's tenure the relations were driven by geopolitical and Cold war rivalries. At that time aid and economic relations were nascent. During Sir Masire's tenure the political relations were also strong as evidenced by visits by the officials from both sides and Sir Masire's support of China in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square event. The amount of aid that China gave to Botswana picked up during Sir Masire's time. The rehabilitation of railway line and the arrival of the first of medical team are cases in point. It is during President Mogae's tenure that clearly economic and aid relations gained momentum. With FOCAC commitments, Botswana was able to develop a few infrastructure projects through low-interest and concessional loans. It is also a time when bilateral trade rose as compared to the other tenures.

Even during President Khama the political drivers were still valid. As already stated out of the 5 Presidents that Botswana has had, only Dr Lt. Gen. Seretse Khama Ian Khama has not visited China during his tenure. However, senior Government officials and some Cabinet Ministers of the Khama's administration had visited China and attended FOCAC meetings. For example, Former Foreign Affairs Minister Pelonomi Venson-Moitoi had visited Beijing (<http://africachinareporting.co.za/2016/09/will-a-new-era-of-china-africa-relations-power-up-botswana>). In 2015, the two countries celebrated 40 years of diplomatic partnership and a ceremony befitting was

held in Gaborone hosted by the Chinese Embassy. Officials from both governments publicly showered accolades to each other in what they described as a time-tested friendship. Though former President has on several occasions publicly condemned or went against China's wishes; the Syria, South China Sea as well as The Dalai Lama issues, political relations seem to be still secure. Cabinet Ministers of his administration had showered praises at China as evidenced by Minister Dorcus Makgato when she welcomed the Chinese medical team. Ministers of his cabinet as well as officials from the Foreign Affairs have continually denied any rift (<https://www.facebook.com/ThePatriotOnSunday/posts/1454772911278107>). Officials from both governments have publicly denounced reports of bad relations and maintained that diplomatic relations were intact (Chinese Embassy website, 2018). The new president, Dr Mokgweetsi Eric Keabetswe Masisi (who was the Vice President of Dr Ian Khama Seretse Khama) visited China in September 2018 for the FOCAC meeting.

Sekakela (2016:6) states that, "China is now Botswana's fastest growing trading partner. Today China is Botswana's 12th largest export market, and third most important source of imports." Sekakela concludes that the trade channel is the main driver of the two countries' bilateral relations (ibid). She illustrates the assertion by stating that "bilateral trade was nearly zero, 30 years ago, it has now surged to BWP 265 million by 2006 and rising again to BWP 2.1 billion in 2012" (Sekakela,2016:2). According to Sekakela (2016:2), "in 2004, China's exports to Botswana reached USD\$49.54 million while the Botswana's imports to China amounted to USD\$2.86 million". According to

the Chinese Embassy website, China's main export items to Botswana include textile, garments, machinery and electronic products (China Embassy website, 2018).

Several scholars have written to some extent about Chinese aid in Botswana. Ian Taylor (1998,84) the distinguished China-Africa expert traces the start of aid to Botswana to 1976. He states that Chinese aid to Botswana, “can be categorized into three; agriculture, medical and technical” (ibid). For this research, aid (grants, technical assistance, interest-free loans and concessional loans) will be categorised as; infrastructure, medical and education. As already stated, Chinese aid to Botswana can be said to have started in 1976 when Gaborone and Beijing signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement. According to Taylor, “Gaborone later received, an amount of US\$16.6 million interest free loan to be used for development projects” (Taylor, 1998: 84).

Chen (2009:4) discusses the contribution of China in Botswana’s infrastructure and explains that, “linking this vast country to its towns and urban centres has been a priority of Government since independence, along with the need to build modern infrastructure to accommodate a burgeoning population.” Infrastructure development is a pillar stone for all industrializing countries and Botswana is no exception. Chen (2009:5) concludes that in that regard China has played a major part in Botswana, it explained that the fact that Chinese firms offer competition to other traditional construction companies implies that the government is able to save and estimated the cost saved to about one-quarter to about one-third.

Chen went on to further posit that, “Chinese construction companies have also found themselves a home in Botswana. It has been reported that there are 16 State Owned Enterprises (SOE’s) and an estimated 10-20 privately owned Chinese Construction companies operating in Botswana” (Chen, 2009:11). Chen gives an example of CSCEC which is said to have come to Botswana to build the Chinese Embassy but has since stayed and won other tenders, (ibid).

Taylor (1998:85) concludes that, “Beijing’s aid has thus managed to maintain Chinese presence in Botswana which has complimented China’s other policies towards Gaborone and allowed Beijing to enjoy cordial relations with Botswana at relatively little actual cost to itself.” Infrastructure or technical assistance is one area in Botswana-China aid relations, that is most praised by both governments’ officials. The protocol on the renewal and development of the Botswana’s railway line was signed in 1982 (Taylor, 1998: 85). However, work started, in earnest, in 1985. According to Chen (2009:7), the railway project was done in five phases and the key implementing party was CCECC. The last phase of the railway project (1997-2001) was financed by a concessional loan as well as the Letlhakeng-Kang highway, and housing project consisting of 424 affordable houses built in 2005 (ibid). Bolaane, (2007:162) also gives examples of infrastructure projects and one such example is the Letlhakeng-Kang road project which was financed by a concessional loan. It was done in phases, the first phase in 2003 and the second in 2006 (ibid).

The Chinese Government has elaborated how much they have given as aid to Botswana. For example during the signing of the Memorandum Of Agreement between China and Botswana (2013) on the awarding of a P110 million grant, the Chinese Ambassador to Botswana, His Excellency Zhuqiang revealed that China has provided economic assistance to Botswana's development in the form of grants, interest-free loans, concessional loans used in financing the renovation and upgrading of 587 kilometres of railway, the construction of more than 200 kilometres of Letlhakeng-Kang road, the construction of 717 residential houses and two primary schools (Daily News, 2013).

The then Botswana Foreign Affairs Minister, Lt. Gen. Mompoti S. Merafhe, had cited that Botswana is one of the countries that continue to receive financial and technical support from China (Bolaane,2007:162). In an interview, the former Foreign Affairs Minister, Lt. Gen. Mompoti S. Merafhe was full of praises for the Chinese aid. "In the past, China has provided us with soft loans for infrastructure projects; some of these include the renovation of the Botswana railway, low-cost housing, land survey and planning, road construction, health facilities, agricultural technology, and Human Resource development. At this time, Chinese funding is being used to complete a road from Gaborone into the hinterland that cuts across the Kalahari Desert. Other funds are helping to build a youth centre in Gaborone as well as two rural primary schools and a botanical garden" (The Economic Observer, 2008).

Aid has also been extended in the medical area. The first medical team arrived in Botswana in 1981 (Chinese Embassy website, 2018). As recent, as 2018, Botswana received another batch of doctors who will work in Botswana. Speaking at the signing ceremony, Ambassador Zhao highlighted the importance of medical cooperation between Botswana and China. According to him, China has sent 14 batches of medical teams comprising of a total of 415 medical personnel since 1981, which have helped treat and cure more than 2 million Batswana throughout the years and trained large numbers of local medical staff (ibid). He acknowledged the time-honoured friendship between the two countries and commended the signing of the newly amended Protocol as a vivid display of China's determination and commitment to the development of friendly and cooperative bilateral relations (Chinese Embassy website, 2018).

Minister Makgato in her remarks appreciated the Chinese Government for supporting Botswana over the years, especially in times of need. She said that medical cooperation is itself an important part of partnership between the two countries. She emphasised that the signing of the protocol symbolized the true spirit of friendship, partnership and brotherhood between Botswana and China. The 15th Chinese medical team of 46 personnel will work at Princess Marina and Nyangabgwe Referral Hospitals in Botswana (Chinese Embassy website, 2018).

The education sector has previously and continues to benefit from Chinese aid. The Daily News (2013) reported that Mr Phandu Skelemani, former Foreign Affairs Minister had expressed his gratitude towards China for

assisting in the education of Batswana. The former Minister had commended that the Chinese had started with awarding 5 scholarships and have now increased to 17 scholarships annually. Still in education, primary schools have been built with the assistance of China (Ibid).

In a reception to send off 34 Batswana students to study in China Ambassador of China to Botswana, Mr Zheng Zhuqiang spoke of the long-standing bilateral relations, Botswana and China have, especially regarding education and said, “since 1980s, China has provided a total of almost 800 government scholarships to Botswana students. Given the growing interest among Botswana students to study in China, China greatly increased the number of scholarships offered to Botswana in recent years” (<https://www.facebook.com/Botswana.Government/posts/1071372342945423>).

A Confucius Institute was set up in the University of Botswana and has opened its doors. During the address by H.E Mr. Liu Huanxing, Chinese Ambassador to Botswana then, on the 27th of September 2010, at the reception on occasion of the 62nd Anniversary of the Founding of the People's Republic of China, the Confucius institute was mentioned as a positive development in strengthening the educational as well as cultural exchanges between the countries. By then the institute had trained 700 Batswana in Chinese language (<http://bw.chineseembassy.org/eng/xwdt/t863214.htm>).

4.1.2 CURRENT STATUS OF THE BOTSWANA-CHINA RELATIONS

The research also seeks to explain the state of relations between the two countries. According to Youngman (2017), Moahi (2015), Youngman (2013) and Bolaane (2007), generally the current status of the relations is not pleasing and they have termed the relations as controversial and problematic. “It is concluded that there are a variety of problems within the bilateral relationship” (Youngman,2017). The local people have also shown displeasure towards China. There have been complaints that the Chinese businesses have not really brought employment, the goods that the Chinese sell are of low quality and that the bilateral trade is skewed towards China and Botswana has the raw end of the deal (Chen ,2009; Moahi, 2015; Sekakela ,2017).

Chen (2009:14) states that there are a lot of misgivings in Botswana when it comes to Chinese products’ quality and job creation. The scholar further states that, “while Batswana believed they are not given jobs by the Chinese, the Chinese on the other hand, believe that there is a shortage of skills locally and that forces them to look somewhere else” (Chen,2009:8-9). Chen just like Bolaane (2007) also alluded to challenges in the relations between Botswana and China although Chen referred to them as misperceptions and rumours as some have not been validated (Chen,2009:17). In conclusion the scholar advises that, “debates around the importation of Chinese labour, material and equipment need to be balanced against the availability of material and local labour, as well as the commercial needs of participating firms” (Ibid).

Youngman (2013:8) sums up the main controversies and points out that, “problems have arisen around issues of tendering procedures, delivery delays, quality of workmanship, allegations of corruption, poor labour relations, occupational health and safety problems and lack of skills transfer”. The failed/delayed construction projects like the refurbishment of the Sir Seretse Khama Airport, the Shanghai Fengyue Glass Manufacturing Company as well as the Morupule B Power Plant as some of the reasons that are usually cited and blamed for the current status (Youngman (2013:8). Former President Lt. Gen Dr Seretse Khama Ian Khama is quoted to have said, “were it not for delays and problems with the Chinese-constructed power plant Botswana would be totally self-sufficient” (<http://africanpresidentialcentre.wordpress.com/201304/17/bots-says-no-to-China/>).

The media has also written a lot about China in Botswana. Moahi (2015) argued that the media has portrayed the relationship as both positive and negative. Of the stories in four newspapers that Moahi (2015:67) analysed, 154 stories portrayed the relationship as positive and 97 stories as negative. In response to media coverage, the Chinese Embassy had hosted press conferences.

On the political front, Botswana was seen to have castigated China openly. Botswana has made its stand publicly known against China during the South China Sea and The Dalai Lama issues. There are those who say Botswana is not targeting China per se but its entire orientation has shifted to being quicker to reprimand where it feels democracy has been flouted.

According to Malia and Molebatsi (2014:16), “Botswana has generally shown a penchant to be one of the first countries to denounce rogue states or call for censure of governments and political leaders that are being accused of human rights abuses and anti-democratic conduct.” Interestingly, the criticism has been reserved for African countries and China. They further give examples of when Botswana broke ranks with her African counterparts like when it called for President Uhuru Kenyatta to answer for charges at the ICC and when Botswana alluded to unfairness in the Zimbabwean 2013 elections and called for an election audit (ibid). However, it is perhaps important to note that, the criticism has been mainly rhetoric as no action has been taken by Botswana to initiate a motion at an international or regional organisation against any country that it has called out previously.

Another politically thorny issue would be Dalai Lama’s visit. According to Shinn and Eisenman (2012:85), “Tibet is another sensitive issue though it does not carry the same weight as Taiwan, this is because Taiwan has its own government, Tibet is still very much a part of China and its leaders are in exile”. South Africa has on several occasions succumbed to Chinese pressure and refused The Dalai Lama a visa (Shinn and Eisenman, 2012: 95). President Khama made it clear that The Dalai Lama is more than welcome to Botswana as China’s enemies are not theirs (Botswana Guardian, 17 August 2017). Though the visit failed as it was reported that the Dalai Lama was not well, the President unequivocally extended him an invitation to visit once he is in good health (ibid). The South China Sea and Tibet issues are attestation of the problematic state of the political relations.

Officials from both countries have continuously denied any tension in the relations, and business has continued as usual (<http://africachinareporting.co.za/2016/09/will-a-new-era-of-china-africa-relations-power-up-botswana>). According to data presented, the tension emanating from economic relations between Botswana and China has spilled into the political relations where the Botswana Government has been seen to openly castigate China, a deviant from the independent foreign policy that they are supposedly following. The media and local people have been seen to castigate China loudly and openly, politicians from across the divide, ruling and opposition have also shown their displeasure in different forums. For example through, the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) politicians dealt with the China issue (<http://africachinareporting.co.za/2016/09/will-a-new-era-of-china-africa-relations-power-up-botswan> and the UDC led protest demonstrations (Botswana Daily News ,6th September 2015). Despite all that, officials from both countries deny any rift and maintain that good diplomatic, time-tested relations still exist.

4.1.3 DETERMINANTS OF THE CURRENT STATUS OF RELATIONS

The general consensus is that disagreements in some aspects of Botswana-China economic relations; the quality of Chinese products, workmanship, is the main source of the current tension in the relations. Youngman (2013) asserts that it is clear that the economic relations have become the main

source of problems in the bilateral relationship. But is it really the only determining factor?

From data presented the domestic level comprising of (the overarching powers of the presidency emanating from the Constitution, unwritten foreign policy document, public and media) is another determining factor in the current state of relations. For example, with an unwritten foreign policy document and a constitution that has granted the President extensive powers then the President can determine the foreign policy behaviour and direction of the country. In Youngman (2017:39), it was found that, “respondents of both nationalities expressed the view that the personal attitude of President Khama seems to be negative towards China and this has a major influence on Botswana’s current approach to bilateral relations.” Statements such as these are validated by the fact that the Presidency has extensive powers which cannot be curtailed since there is no written Foreign Policy strategy. This allows Presidents to make reactive Foreign Policy decisions.

Politicians from across the divide have expressed their displeasure regarding Chinese workmanship in some projects. Still on the domestic level there are indications that the ruling party feels it must express public criticism of China in order to counter the potential appeal of opposition politicians who have been strident in their denunciations of Chinese enterprises for some time as evidenced (Sautman & Hairong ,2009:730). According to Youngman (2017:24) there are perceptions that, “although the problem is essentially economic, the failed construction projects have had significant political

ramifications, especially affecting views within the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), which did comparatively poorly in the 2014 elections...” A prominent member of Parliament (from the ruling party) and a PAC member, Honourable Samson Guma Moyo, had publicly claimed, “the Botswana government and individuals were concerned about the performance of some Chinese companies working on Botswana projects” (<http://africachinareporting.co.za/2016/09/will-a-new-era-of-china-africa-relations-power-up-botswana>). He was quoted to have said, “We want to know how we are dealing with poor performance of Chinese contractors because the two countries cannot enjoy good relations when there are issues of poor performance that have led to sour relations,” (ibid). As discussed, the Public Accounts Committee, (membership comprises of both ruling and opposition) has called the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to account for the state of the Sino-Botswana relations. (<http://africachinareporting.co.za/2016/09/will-a-new-era-of-china-africa-relations-power-up-botswana>). An assessment team led by the then Minister of Infrastructure, Science and Technology have also visited Chinese projects all over Botswana as sanctioned by Cabinet which clearly shows that there was a cause for concern. The then Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr Venson-Moitoi had embarked on a visit to China to specifically address the above-named issues (<http://africachinareporting.co.za/2016/09/will-a-new-era-of-china-africa-relations-power-up-botswana>).

As already stated, Bolaane (2007) and Chen (2009) also trace the start of the tension/current state of relations to the public as well as the media. Before

public criticisms by the then President, members of his cabinet or other members of the ruling party it was clearly the media and public who had raised complaints against the Chinese. A content analysis of Botswana media on Sino-Botswana relations concludes that, “the people to people, cultural and technical exchange activities were positive. However, there was some scepticism expressed in certain quarters, and certain aspects of the Chinese people’s conduct in business and economic areas were viewed negatively, and these tended to spill over into other dimensions such as the political, diplomatic and community relations” (Moahi,2015:72). The media has played a part in determining the Botswana and China relations.

Therefore, one can only conclude that economic relations between the two countries are strained and tension can also be noticed in the political relations (the Dalai Lama visa, South China Sea) as illustrated even though Government has vehemently denied this conclusion. The international factors; a Botswana that now has majority ruled states as neighbours and the triumph of democracy, the domestic level (the public, media, unwritten foreign policy strategy) and the individual level has determined the state of relations between Botswana and China.

4.2 DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

From the findings, there is a clear indication that principles or drivers that used to determine the Botswana’s Foreign Policy towards other external countries have changed. The Cold War has ended and that has meant a foreign policy of state survival as explained is no longer necessary. This then now means that new issues have cropped up that determine how Botswana

relates to other countries. As Jiang (1996:10) states, “no sources of foreign policy remain static; foreign policy determinants change over time, resulting in foreign policy adjustments.” Therefore, what are the new drivers? Jiang (1996:23) captures the three-level analysis in FPA perfectly by stating that, “as changes take place in IR, in the nation’s domestic political, or even in its political leadership, every nation, from time to time, has to adjust its FP accordingly”.

It is evident that, foreign policy is a two-level game that is, both the domestic and international environment are equally important as drivers. As Putman (1998:127) postulates, “neither of the two levels can be ignored by central decision makers, so long as countries remain interdependent, yet sovereign.” In that context, the international environment that Botswana finds herself in, is not the same environment that she was in when relations were formed with China. As already stated, Botswana and China shared some mutual respect for each other because of their shared independent foreign policies during the Cold War and the minority ruled politics of Southern Africa (Taylor ,1998:82).

Botswana, because of the precarious situation she was in; having white and separatist governments as some of its neighbours, was able to maintain an intricate balance between not angering her neighbours and forging relations with like-minded countries. Botswana’s relations with China at the time was clearly realist; that small and less powerful states for them to survive have to bandwagon with the strongest. The Cold War ended in 1989, Botswana’s separatist neighbour governments have since collapsed and have been

replaced by multi-party governments. Writing immediately after the Cold War, Zaffiro (1992), emphasised that, “new reasons for maintaining existing relationships must be found as the original ones; Cold War and apartheid-inspired calculations of national interest and geo-political constraints have since fallen away.” This explains that, because of the changes in the international stage, reasons for countries to be diplomatic friends have since changed as the old ones make way for new patterns.

Everywhere relations between Botswana and China or any other country were explained by Cold War and geopolitical machinations. This then implies that the removal of these (cold war and geo-political factors) was surely going to cause changes in the relations as new questions for framing the current relations come into the equation. While Botswana’s foreign policy position was partly confined by its size during the Cold War and the Southern African minority ruled states politics, the new international environment seems to have given Botswana some confidence. Before adopting any position, Botswana was constantly finding a perfect balance between being a sovereign in its own right and not angering South Africa. Zaffiro (1992; 98) predicted that, “the next generation of national leaders are not likely to rule in so moderate and pragmatic fashion and be able to generate and maintain so extensive and viable a consensus on national development and foreign policy objectives, strategies and national interests as its exceptional predecessors in state house.”

Zaffiro (1992:102) quotes former President Masire to have said that because of how small Botswana is, its future will largely be influenced by events

taking place around it. Hey (2003:5) posited that small states exhibit low participation in world affairs and prefer to adopt neutral positions. This is clearly not the case with Botswana towards China or other African states. As already shown Botswana has been boldly taking positions, examples as already mentioned are the SADC-Zimbabwe issue or the AU as well as the statement on the South China Sea and The Dalai Lama position. It is clear from examples presented that Botswana, is not conforming to realist theorising. The main drivers of the Botswana-China relations can be categorised into political, economic and aid (infrastructure, medical, education). As a developing country the need to develop its infrastructure, attract foreign direct investment, increase trade volumes as dictated by the national development agenda seems to take priority in its Foreign policy.

Regarding the South China Sea, Botswana issued a press statement that, “no country, no matter how big its economy or military should impose its power over others to make claims, which may escalate tensions that could result in conflicts” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation Facebook page: 2016). The stance on South China Sea by Botswana is a clear criticism of the actions of China in the South China Sea. The open defiance by Botswana in granting the Dalai Lama visa against China’s wishes is another issue. This is a contrast to previous foreign policy towards China or any other country. Botswana as described in Taylor pursued an independent foreign policy, where it preferred to stay as far away as possible from controversial issues (Taylor,1998:81). These two behaviours are clearly inconsistent with realist thinking. If Botswana adhered to realist thinking

then the fact that it is smaller, or less powerful than China and the fact that it is placed in Africa should have made it not brave enough to castigate China openly or even issue visas to China's enemies.

Bolaane (2007), Chen (2009) and Moahi (2015) alluded to the fact that the start of tension in the relations between the two countries could be attributed to domestic constituents of Botswana; public, politicians as well as the media. Could that be the cause of this apparent shift in foreign policy? This means that foreign policy actors keeping in cognizance of the unhappiness of Botswana over the Chinese projects were compelled to adopt positions consistent to the mood of the electorates. The power outages made a lot of Botswana unhappy. "Apart from an easing in the first seven months of 2016, Botswana has faced restrictive electricity supply since 2008 with frequent breakdowns at Morupule B meaning on average it has only run at about a third of its capacity" (<http://africachinareporting.co.za/2016/09/will-a-new-era-of-china-africa-relations-power-up-botswana>). The power shortage is one issue that the former president was particularly critical of and his sentiments have been captured (see Business Day Live, 2013: February 20). Reynolds (1980) encapsulates it better by stating that, "though the major actors on the international stage are states, their actions ought to serve the purposes of individuals and individuals exist in a variety of groups, including the global group."

The constituencies have the power to determine the redirection in foreign policy as their views, opinions, and interests are important to the leaders

and the regime. The start of this tension emanated from the constituents and opposition politicians. The domestic constituents were not happy about cheap Chinese products, complained that Chinese businesses had not created jobs and most seriously about the failure of huge and important infrastructure projects like Morupule B. Botswana Foreign Policy actors knowing the danger of them ignoring these important constituents had no choice but to adopt foreign policy behaviours consistent with the mood of the domestic constituents. The sentiments are captured in Youngman (2017:24) and attributed to a respondent who is a diplomat/government official. “In the build-up to the 2014 elections, people and the media in particular, vehemently lamented these projects. The President felt that the failed projects contributed to the reduced BDP majority”. It explains the actions of the government following the 2014 elections; the Minister of Foreign Affairs’ visit to China and the assessment exercise of Chinese projects carried out by the Minister of Infrastructure, Science and Technology.

Still in the domestic context the power of the media in influencing opinion cannot be dismissed. As already shown in the paper, the media in Botswana has played a role in influencing the foreign policy actors with regard to the China issue. China is aware of that, the embassy here in Botswana held several briefings with the media specifically to address its misgivings. In one such briefing the Chinese embassy stated that it has, “noted with concerns some stories which seem intent on destroying the good name of the Chinese businesses and people in the minds of the locals” (Chinese Embassy, 2017).

Bolaane, (2007) and Moahi (2015) have discussed the extent of coverage of China in Botswana media. Though the reports do not necessarily say China is entirely bad, it is not comforting that they show that negative news about China are mainly about the economic or trade relations, an area that elsewhere is shown as the strongest contributor to the Botswana-China relations.

The fact that Botswana's Constitution gives the President extensive powers, (foreign policy included), implies that in addition to the reactions from the public and media, the Constitution can also be a determining factor of the direction of foreign policy in the case of China. As already discussed, Section 92, gives the president powers to "dissolve a democratically elected Parliament, even though the President himself is not democratically or popularly elected" (Mogalakwe & Nyamnjoh, 2017:4). The President then, Lt. Gen Seretse Khama Dr Ian Khama did not hide his disappointment in some Chinese construction works. As a result, his cabinet (that he appoints) sent the Foreign Affairs minister to China to formally lodge complaints. In addition, the then Minister of Infrastructure, Science and Technology also carried out an assessment of Chinese projects all over the country. Member of PAC and ruling party veteran Honourable Samson Guma Moyo also made his complaints against China heard. This can be argued as indications of support to the President's position towards China. This is a President who had the power granted to him by the Constitution to set the tone of the foreign policy posture of the whole country.

As already discussed, “the state is not a person, it has no moral attributes and has no inherent right to survive” (Reynolds, 1980). This then puts the individual as compared to state and system as the main actor in foreign policy. Therefore, this further compels us to further analyse the contribution of the individuals, groups in the foreign policy making of Botswana. In doing that, it is also good to take into consideration that the individual actor does not act in a vacuum. According to the data presented, it is during the fourth presidency that a change in foreign policy behaviour towards China was noticed. Malia and Molebatsi, (2014:15) state that, “the general consensus amongst observers is that the recent shift in foreign policy can be attributed to the change in leadership as well as the change in the style of leadership following Khama’s assumption of the presidency”.

Therefore, Khama and his foreign policy team as individual actors are attributed to this foreign policy redirection. This is consistent with Reynolds’ (1980:53) assertion that, “...who the decision makers are in particular questions will much affect the selection made among the means available”. The extent of the presidential powers in foreign policy making in Botswana have been illustrated. Motsamai (2015:4) asserts that the President has overarching powers over foreign policy making this then means that he/she plays a big role. This therefore means that the personality traits of the president are important determinants.

Therefore, acting in a changed international as well as the domestic environment the Botswana Foreign Policy actors, redirected the foreign policy behaviour towards China. Whilst other countries have clearly stated

their re-direction of their foreign policies, Botswana has not. As Jian, (1996:1) has stated China announced in 1982 that it would adopt a new foreign policy known as an, “Independent Foreign Policy of Peace”. Botswana might have not done that, but it is apparent that a shift has occurred in its foreign policy. As already stated, Botswana is more public in its chastising what it deems undemocratic practices by China and many other countries; Sudan, Zimbabwe, Syria, e.tc. (Osei-Hwedie and Mokhawa ,2015:19). This is clearly inconsistent with Botswana’s Independent Foreign Policy but it shows an adherence to the tenets of Constructivism where ideational factors matter more other than physical/material factors. It matters more that ideas of democracy, rule of law and peace are protected to Botswana it seems.

The redirection of Botswana’s Foreign Policy is consistent with Gustavsson’s (1999) model. Changes in the international factors; end of Cold war, collapse of white-minority ruled states and the triumph of democracy and domestic factors like; the constituents’ unhappiness over what they termed shoddy projects, opposition politicians’ open criticism over Chinese projects as well as the negative media coverage, all these issues meant that the individual decision maker or the group of decision makers are working in a different environment from that of his predecessors. These international and domestic factors were brought along to the decision-making process and that effected changes in the Foreign Policy direction of Botswana towards China. The changes are consistent to Hermann (1990) model as Botswana has since introduced new instruments of statecraft. As already stated, Botswana became quick to criticise what it terms undemocratic practices.

The initial problems (Cold War, white minority ruled states) that Botswana faced have been cast aside and have since been replaced. Botswana according to data presented has changed its entire orientation towards some countries. Despite the redirection of Foreign Policy, people continued to buy Chinese goods and the government also continued to do business with Chinese companies. The respondents in Youngman (2017:30), “pointed out that the Botswana government had benefitted from the lower construction prices for its projects and that Botswana consumers had benefitted from the availability of cheap goods provided by the small Chinese-owned shops”.

In explaining the redirection of China’s Foreign Policy, Jian (1996) stated that, “while state transformation and revolution are obvious reasons why a state can change its foreign policy position, in most cases, foreign policy redirection is a self-correcting change by an incumbent government”. China itself is said to have, “shifted its African policy from an unsustainable and ideologically-motivated approach to political pragmatism and on to the present relationship that is based on economic pragmatism” (Anshan, 2007:74).As stated earlier, foreign policy is a two-level game, hence as much as international sources of foreign policy have been identified, domestic sources are as much factors to consider in explanations of any relations between countries.

In scrutinising the current Sino-Botswana literature one can deduce that the main drivers for the relations can be categorised into political, economic and aid (infrastructure, medical, education). As deduced from the data, the political connection between China and Botswana is still very important to

both parties. The diplomatic relationship has been nourished by state visits by the leaders of both countries and bilateral agreements that they continue to enter into in the technical, educational, and cultural areas.

Geopolitical issues having been pushed to the back of the relations; data presented prove that the economics is one of the main drivers of the relations between Botswana and China. “Whilst there was agreement amongst the majority of respondents that the economic dimension is the most significant dimension of the relationship, a Chinese diplomat made the important caveat that these economic links are relatively weak compared to other African countries” (Youngman,2017:2). However, it is interesting that Sekakela (2016:2) found that Botswana mainly exports primary goods while China imports intermediate or capital goods mainly used for the development of infrastructure to Botswana. Despite the uneven trade relations, the fact that bilateral trade that was nearly zero just 30 years ago has increased to BWP 2.1 billion in 2012 (Sekakela,2016:2), cannot be ignored. Therefore, it is correct to assert that the economic relations are part of the main drivers of the Botswana-China relations.

Data has also shown how important aid has been to the relations between the two. In 2018, when relations were supposedly at their lowest, a team of doctors arrived in Botswana. The 15th Chinese medical team, was welcomed by the then Minister of Health, Ms Dorcus Makgato. Chinese assistance in infrastructure has been appreciated by the Botswana officials as well as members of the public. As already presented the Chinese have helped build rail roads, roads and buildings. The respondents in Youngman (2017:30),

“pointed out that the Botswana government had benefitted from lower construction prices for its projects”. However, Taylor (1996: 81-82) argues that China’s aid towards Botswana has been modest but however consistent and seems to have served its purpose by enabling Beijing to have an ongoing presence in Botswana at little cost. This is supported by Chen (2009) that Chinese aid projects have helped Chinese State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) enter the Botswana construction market. An example is given of CCECC which first came to Botswana in 1985 to do the rehabilitation of the railway (ibid).

As already presented Botswana Government officials have gone on record in appreciation of the aid, they receive which also does prove that aid is one important driver for the Botswana-China relations. According to Ambassador Zhao Yanbo, “China has funded over 40 projects in Botswana, ranging from refurbishing railways and constructing houses, to building primary schools. Chinese medical teams have treated more than 2 million people in the African country over the past decades” (http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/africa/2018/08/29/c_137428779.htm).

4.3 CHAPTER SUMMARY

In this chapter, data was presented into themes; drivers of the relations, current status of the relations and determinants of the current state of relations. It was found that; politics, economics and aid drive relations between the two. The main driver was identified as economics. It was found that Botswana has redirected its foreign policy and that redirection can best

be explained by Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). That the individual as the main actor, does not act in a vacuum but in both the domestic and international context. Therefore, the complex interplay of the individual in a changed domestic and international environment has resulted in the foreign policy redirection towards China during President Khama's tenure.

The then, President Khama, with his own team of advisors;

- acting in a changed domestic environment, (the unhappiness of the public over shoddy projects and the loss of jobs as well as the reports from media about almost the same issues
- a Constitution that gives the president overarching powers and unwritten Foreign Policy document
- as well as a changed international environment from the previous one, where Botswana was small and insignificant, sandwiched by unfriendly minority ruled states, to a more peaceful and democratic environment made it conducive for a foreign policy redirection towards China.

In a nutshell, the domestic and international environment during Khama was different from that of the first, second or third President and coupled with the differences as individuals, between the four men influenced how President Khama, as the fourth President and his team redirected foreign policy towards China. Who the president is and the team of advisors are, operating in a domestic and international environment determine the foreign policy behaviour of the country?

CHAPTER 5

5.0 CONCLUSION

This research uses the three level of analysis; the individual, the state, and the international system. The individual level of analysis was however dominant. Breuning, (2007;11) could have not said it better; “these three levels of analysis correspond to the different foci of foreign policy analysis: individuals ponder options and make decisions, states engage in foreign policy behaviours, and the interaction between states in the international system yields outcomes.” Therefore, the relations between Botswana and China can best be explained in that way.

The individual level of analysis; the president, team of advisors are important factors that contribute to a state foreign policy behaviour. The overarching powers that the President is granted by the Constitution at the domestic level has also played an important part in the direction of foreign policy.

The state and its domestic constituents are equally important even so for a democracy where votes are very important if a government wants to be or stay in power. The fact that the media, the public and opposition politicians were lambasting China and its projects and products left the Government in question, with no power but to act upon and adopt actions that will show that they are dealing with the China issue. Some of the actions that did show that the Government of the day is being responsive to the China issue include; the Cabinet decision to send the then Foreign Affairs Minister Dr

Venson-Moitoi to China to formally lodge the complaints. The Public Accounts Committee (PAC) also investigated allegations of shoddy work and failure of projects. The then Minister of Infrastructure, Science and Technology had also set up and chaired an assessment team for Chinese projects.

The third level of analysis; the system or international level of analysis is also an important factor. Whilst Botswana was from independence constrained by its size, the conditions as of now are different; Cold War has ended and that means the security situation of Botswana has changed. The fact that the white ruled minority states that were Botswana's neighbours have now mutated to inclusive governments has meant that Botswana is not as fearful of being annexed or bombed when it asserts itself. The end of Cold War means that, democracy has triumphed and the world now celebrates freedom and the rule of law. Botswana therefore like all other liberal democracies is celebrating their triumph.

The current tension between their relations does not spell doom to Botswana-China relations but a re-orientation of foreign policy. An individual decision maker will always take the domestic and international factors to the decision-making process which will result in changes as predicated by Hermann (1990). In this way, Botswana has re-oriented its foreign policy towards China. As already illustrated the trade volume between the two is quite high. Botswana's economy is heavily reliant on the diamond and China is now the second largest consumer of Botswana's diamond. Officials seem happy to accept assistance in whatever form from

China and have at any given chance commended China for being an aid provider. Botswana being a middle-class economy is not a favourite when it comes to aid disbursements from the West therefore Chinese assistance packages are well needed for necessary sectors such as infrastructure. Even when reports were rife that the two countries relations were in turmoil the officials from both governments vehemently denied such reports. Chinese businesses and people have found a home in Botswana. In a nutshell, the drivers for the relations between the two countries seem strong and have worked for them for quite some time. During Lt. Gen. Dr Seretse Khama Ian Khama's tenure there seemed to have been a love-hate relationship where despite public displays of disapproval towards China on the one hand, Botswana on the other hand, was still maintaining that relations between the two were strong and durable. The two entered into several bilateral agreements for development of infrastructure projects as already stated. The main driver of relations-trade, also continued and increases were notable even during Khama's tenure.

On the 01st of April 2018 a new President, His Excellency Eric Keabetswe Mokgweetsi Masisi was sworn in as the 5th President of Botswana. He has already appointed his foreign policy team. This obviously will have impact on the current status of the relations. President Masisi visited China and attended the FOCAC meeting in Beijing in September 2018. "Masisi's visit is his first trip to China since assuming presidency in April, and also the first visit to China by Botswana's head of state in 12 years" (http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/africa/201808/29/c_137428779.htm).

This is already a sign that once again the individual because of an unwritten Foreign policy strategy and a constitution that gives him extensive powers, will determine the foreign policy direction of Botswana towards China. Just like it happened during the past presidencies as illustrated; Sir Seretse Khama's support of PRC's UN Security Council seat bid, Sir Masire's support of China during the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square event, Dr Festus Mogae's comparison of the West to China or Dr Khama's public criticism of China. As Motsamai (2015: 12) postulates "there is no national consensus in defining Botswana's national interests and how, in achieving them, the country behaves towards others, politically, socially, economically and militarily." Where there is no consensus there is confusion and decisions are taken on an ad hoc basis. From the findings of the research it has been learnt that if constitutional amendments regarding the extensive powers of the Presidency and the Foreign Policy strategy of Botswana continues to be unwritten then every President will continue to determine the foreign policy direction and behaviour of the country.

5.1 RECOMMENDATIONS

The formulation of an official foreign policy document for Botswana is long overdue and it is recommended that the current Government through the Ministry of International Affairs and Cooperation (MIAC) resuscitate the foreign policy consultations. A written foreign policy document will constrain Presidents from relying on their own personal sentiments when making Foreign Policy decisions as the Former President has been accused of. It is evident from this research that the foreign policy process consists of different actors not just the ruling party hence all these other actors need to be given opportunity to define or determine the foreign policy.

As already mentioned, China formalised its Foreign Policy and it is very clear how it deals with Africa, through the Forum of China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) and clear policies exist and are documented. Examples are; China Africa Policy (2006) and two Foreign Aid documents (2011 and 2014) which also clearly postulate China's aid policy. This foreign policy document will be important as Botswana continues to diversify its economy, a sector that clearly plays a huge part in the current state of foreign affairs.

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